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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction to the thesis 
“The Contracting Parties to this Treaty,  
Recognizing the increasingly urgent need for measures to protect the environment, 
including the decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and for 
internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for these purposes,  
Have agreed as follows”1 
The production of energy is among the key drivers of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus of 
climate change. The majority of the world’s energy is still produced through highly polluting 
fossil fuels, and as the demand for energy is continuously increasing, it is evident that states 
need to make considerable changes to their energy policies and hasten the transition to 
renewable forms of energy.2 The energy sector, however, is a powerful actor in the 
formulation of these policies, and thus in combatting climate change.3 A key instrument 
connected to the energy policies of states’ is the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT” or “Treaty”), 
a multilateral agreement covering the entire energy cycle with numerous rules concerning 
trade and investments in energy. 
The Energy Charter Treaty lies at the centre of this paper. The importance of the ECT is 
immense: It has over 50 contracting parties, and concerns solely the energy sector, a field that 
is critical to the security and economy of every state, and the climate of the entire world. 
 
1 Energy Charter Treaty, Preamble 
2 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the global demand for energy and global energy-related 
CO2 emissions had reached the historical peak right before the Covid-19 crisis hit. Further, the IEA projects that 
while the total energy demand will be considerably lower in 2020 relative to 2019, the demand for renewable 
sources of energy would grow. The demand for every other primary source of energy is projected to fall, with 
the projected demand for oil (-9.1%) and coal (-7.7%) falling the most. See International Energy Agency, 
Global Energy Review 2020 (IEA, Paris 2020), accessed at <https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-
2020> on 28 July 2020. 
 
It is uncertain whether such trends will continue should the economic activity normalise eventually. However, 
the Global Energy Review 2020 also shows that the demand for coal within the European Union was already 
declining before the Covid-19 crisis hit. The European Union and its member countries constitute a large part of 
the Energy Charter Treaty contracting parties. Therefore, it is possible that the global pandemic ends up 
hastening the transition towards sustainable forms of energy, and away from coal and oil in particular. If this is 
indeed the case, the pandemic may well have significance in various disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty. 
3 Lotta Aho, Whose game, whose rules: Neoliberal hegemony and corporate power in climate change 
governance: Exploring the outcome in the energy sector (Doctoral Thesis, Aalto University publication series 
95/2020) 14-31 
2 
 
Furthermore, the ECT has been used as a successful tool by the fossil fuel sector to combat 
state measures to protect the environment,4 is among the most litigated treaties, with some of 
the highest arbitral awards rendered under its auspices.5 The combination of these factors has 
led to calls from various NGOs that states should withdraw from the ECT,6 with Russia and 
Italy already having withdrawn from the Treaty.  
This paper examines the environmental aspects of the ECT and aims to decipher if the 
provisions of the ECT could in fact be used to defend states’ environmental measures, rather 
than merely be relied upon by fossil fuel companies, and if so, how and why this could be 
done. Although the ECT is a highly litigated instrument, and is undeniably influential for the 
environment, the tribunals applying it have seldom had the chance to consider the 
environmental aspects of the treaty and never in a dispute arising from state measures to 
protect the environment.7 There are, however, several publicly known disputes arising from 
state measures to protect the environment currently ongoing, which makes the need to 
investigate the significance of the environmental aspects of the ECT all the more pressing. 
1.2. Premise, Research Questions and Limitations 
This paper is based on the premise that the ECT contracting parties have a desire to pass 
stricter laws for the protection of the environment,8 despite the fact that such regulations 
might have adverse effects on foreign investors or on their own economies on a short term. 
This premise somewhat flips the situation of a ‘typical’ environmental dispute, in which a 
state would argue that it has met the minimum requirements of protecting the environment. 
This paper concerns situations where the state asserts that its right to surpass the minimum 
requirements does not necessarily contradict any of the legal rights of foreign investors. It is 
 
4 In Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 (“Vattenfall v. Germany (I)”) the state withdrew its environmental regulations as the 
Swedish energy corporation Vattenfall alleged that the regulations breached its rights. Even a threat of ECT 
proceedings might force a state into ‘compliance’ with the interests of the energy company suggesting making 
such a claim, as was apparently the goal of the energy company Uniper, of which the Finnish company Fortum 
is the majority owner, regarding the Netherlands’ upcoming ban on burning coal for energy production. As the 
Netherlands did not withdraw the legislation, it is likely that an ECT tribunal will eventually consider the 
situation. See: Yamina Saheb, ‘Europe’s Green Deal is under threat from Energy Charter Treaty’ (Euractiv, 20 
September 2019), accessed at <https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/opinion/europes-green-
deal-is-under-threat-from-energy-charter-treaty/> on 25 June 2020. 
5 Yukos cases, (PCA Cases Nos. AA 227; AA 226; and AA 228) where the state was ordered to pay over $50 
billion to the investors. 
6 See, the Open letter on the Energy Charter Treaty, signed by a large number of NGOs, accessed at 
https://www.asso-sherpa.org/open-letter-on-the-energy-charter-treaty-ect on 7 July 2020. 
7 Several cases have been lodged because of such measures, but the disputes are either ongoing or were settled 
by the parties. These cases are discussed below. 
8 The EU has, in particular, been vocal about its concerns regarding the environment as will be discussed below 
in this paper.  
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plausible that such situations will become more commonplace as climate change progresses, 
and its effects become ever more evident.  
Although several non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) view the ECT solely as a tool 
used by fossil fuel companies9, several authors have, in fact, asserted that the environmental 
aspects of the ECT could have significance in ECT disputes.10 However, this assertion has 
not been looked at in-depth by either the authors themselves or the arbitral tribunals applying 
the ECT, with it commonly receiving merely a passing mention of such possibility. This 
thesis aims to prove the assertion that the environmental aspects can indeed have significance 
in dispute settlement, even if the Treaty does not say so explicitly. To do so, I have 
interpreted the relevant provisions of the ECT framework and distilled a coherent 
interpretation of the Treaty that enables states to rely on the environmental aspects of the 
Treaty when responding to investor claims. Secondly, I have formulated applications utilising 
the novel interpretation to combat the most common investor claims and discussed why it 
should be applied by the states and tribunals applying the Treaty. Finally, I have considered 
whether the approach presented is sufficient to ascertain sustainability, or if the Treaty 
requires amendments. Thus, the research questions of this paper can be presented as follows: 
1) What are the environmental aspects of the Energy Charter Treaty framework? 
2) Can the Energy Charter Treaty, in its current form, be interpreted and applied in an 
environmentally sustainable way, and if so, how this could be done? 
3) Why the Energy Charter Treaty should be interpreted and applied in such way? 
 
9 As the ECT contains several provisions regarding the treatment of investors, an investor may under the ECT 
challenge state measures that it considers to be in breach of the state’s obligations towards the investors. Foreign 
investors have successfully managed to get states to backstep on their environmental regulations or claimed 
compensations on both real and hypothetical losses that such regulations would cause. 
10 E.g. Craig S. Bamberger, ‘An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty’ in T.W. Wälde (ed) The Energy 
Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International Ltd 1996) 20. While 
discussing litigation concerning Article 19, Bamberger states that “the absence of ECT dispute resolution does 
not eliminate the possibility that it might be cited in dispute resolution concerning other articles.”  
 
Wälde & Kolo state that the “environmental standards recognised in the treaty are suitable to serve as factors to 
be taken into account… They help to define the legitimacy of environmental policies underlying national 
regulation.” See Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’ (2011) 50 Int’l & Comp LQ 811, 817.  
 
Martles states that it “ would be a mistake to deduce from this limitation [Article 19 being outside the scope of 
Article 26 disputes] that the environmental aspects of the ECT present in Article 19 have no role to play in 
Article 13 disputes centered on expropriation via environmental regulation.” Martles further adds that “Together 
with Article 18(1), Article 19 offers state respondents the ability to counter some investor claims of regulatory 
expropriation.” See Justin R Martles, 'Public Purpose, Private Losses: Regulatory Expropriation and 
Environmental Regulation in International Investment Law' (2007) 16 J Transnat'l L & Pol'y 275, 319-320. 
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4) Does the Energy Charter Treaty require amendments to its current text? 
These questions are of increasing importance, as it is likely that states would wish to pass 
more such environmental regulations.11 Yet, the most common interpretation of the ECT 
could very well cause a regulatory chill, i.e. states would not pass such regulations due to 
fears of investor claims. Therefore, it is important to formulate novel approaches to the ECT, 
that would allow the states more policy room while respecting the rights of the investors. 
As the ECT, in practice, is interpreted in the context of investor-state disputes almost 
exclusively12, this paper follows the same approach, namely a major part of the discussion of 
the environmental aspects of the Treaty is mirrored to the investment protection provisions of 
it. Further, when formulating litigation techniques that apply the findings made regarding the 
first research question, I have focused on arguments suited for the responding state, and on 
the merits phase. It is certainly possible for an investor to argue based on the environmental 
aspects of the Treaty, or for these aspects to have significance during the jurisdiction phase of 
the dispute. However, such situations seem less plausible and the formulation of the 
arguments would be considerably different.13 
1.3. On Methodology, Analogical Reasoning and the Significance of Case Law  
There is no single correct methodology to the research of public international law, or law in 
general, but rather a wide variety of applicable methodologies, of which it is each author’s 
own decision to apply one or more of them.14 Koskenniemi, on the methodology of 
international law, has stated that the question boils down to “how to convince this audience, 
here and now?”.15 Although Koskenniemi’s advice might have been steered more towards the 
practitioners of international law, it nevertheless applies to research as well – the research of 
international law aims to craft a persuasive, legal argument.16 As this paper concerns 
 
11 E.g. In 2019 the Netherlands passed a law aiming at phasing-out coal as a source of energy. It seems likely 
that this law will be challenged by foreign investors. See, Edwin van der Schoot, ‘Claim om kolenverbod voor 
Staat’ (Telegraaf, 5 September 2019), accessed at https://www.telegraaf.nl/financieel/1134267479/claim-om-
kolenverbod-voor-staat on 7 July 2020. 
12 As of 27 July 2020, there are no publicly known inter-state disputes concerning the ECT. The Energy Charter 
Secretariat, in their day to day functioning, naturally does not solely consider disputes. However, the focus of 
this paper is in the disputes, and as such, the day to day functioning of the Energy Charter Secretariat receives 
little attention. 
13 Such situations will be discussed briefly below in this paper. 
14 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’ (2007) Max Planck Encyclopedias of International 
Law [1, 25], Ari Hirvonen, ‘Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan’ (2011) Yleisen oikeustieteen 
julkaisuja 17, 7-9 
15 Koskenniemi, (2007) [25]. 
16 Ibid, [1]. 
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questions such as how the Energy Charter Treaty should be interpreted and applied, I have 
relied mostly on the methodology of doctrinal research.  
Traditionally, doctrinal research has a dual purpose – the interpretation and systematisation of 
existing law, and the subject of research are various legal norms17 essentially meaning, that 
the statements made in a given text or argument are connected to formal legal sources.18 In 
public international law the formal sources of law can be derived from the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), Article 38(1)19 according to which the sources are 1) 
treaties; 2) customary international law; 3) general principles of law; and 4) judicial decisions 
and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as a subsidiary means of determining the 
rules of law.20  
As I have mainly relied on the doctrinal approach, the arguments relating to the 
interpretation21 and application of the law need to be connected to the aforementioned 
sources; the actual provisions of the ECT framework naturally being the priority, as any 
research into particular treaty provisions which fails to consider the provisions in question 
would be a near pointless exercise. Customary international law and the general principles of 
law, on the other hand, have received considerably little attention in this paper – this is 
natural, as the research is of a treaty. Of the abovementioned sources, judicial decisions have 
a somewhat peculiar significance in international law. As this paper refers to a number of 
cases from a variety of courts and tribunals, it is necessary to briefly discuss the significance 
of preceding case law and analogic reasoning in international law, particularly so, as several 
of the referred cases may not be formally connected to the ECT framework at all.22 
 
17 Hirvonen, (2011) 23-25 
18 Koskenniemi, (2007) [7] – [13] 
19 Ibid.  
20 ICJ Statute Art 38(1) reads as follows:  
 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to 
it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
21 Treaty interpretation is discussed in length under Section 2.2. 
22 E.g. NAFTA disputes, which concern an entirely different treaty, with entirely different contracting parties. 
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First of all, it is clear that arbitral tribunals, and other fora of international law, are not bound 
by previous cases adjudicated in any forum, whether it be national or international.23 This 
rule was well articulated by the tribunal in  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. 
Republic of the Philippines, which stated that: 
“[T]here is no doctrine of precedent in international law, if by precedent is meant a 
rule of the binding effect of a single decision. There is no hierarchy of international 
tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal 
in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals.”24 
This, however, by no means implies that previous decisions and awards rendered in various 
cases would be insignificant for arbitral tribunals. A cursory view of almost any given arbitral 
award reveals that the tribunals pay close attention to the works of other similar ad hoc 
tribunals, and at times to the jurisprudence of other international actors such as the ICJ or the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”),25 or even to the jurisprudence of regional or national 
courts.26 The arbitral tribunals are naturally also allowed to rely on such decisions. As 
mentioned, Article 38 of the International Court of Justice27 states that: 
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
  … 
(d) subject to provisions of Article 5928, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of the rules of law.”29 
Thus, the judicial decisions of various courts and tribunals have an important role in the 
practice of arbitral tribunals as a subsidiary means for determining the rules of law. As courts 
and tribunals frequently utilise this approach to determine the rules of law applicable to the 
 
23 Valentina Vadi, Analogies in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 
2015) 138-139; Richard C Chen, 'Precedent and Dialogue in Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2019) 60 Harv Int'l 
LJ 47, 54 
24 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections and Jurisdiction [97]. 
25 Vadi (2015) 144-158 
26 Ibid 159-162 
27 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2019) 19-20 
28 Article 59 confirms that the Court’s decisions are only binding in the context of that particular case, and only 
between the parties of said case. 
29 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(d)  
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situation at hand, any such reasoning is analogical by nature. For this approach to work, the 
case law to be referred must have similarities to the case at hand, i.e. the cases need to be 
analogous with each other. Levi articulated the principle of analogical reasoning in law with 
great clarity, writing that: 
“It is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the doctrine 
of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of 
law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity is seen 
between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the 
rule of law is made applicable to the second case.”30 
Arbitral tribunals often invoke such analogical approach, and understandably so, as the 
various investment treaties often utilise similar language or concern similar situations.31 
Arguably the application of analogical reasoning and precedence creates coherence in 
international law32 and thus allows for greater predictability, accuracy and legitimacy of 
arbitral awards.33 Analogical reasoning, however, has certain caveats to its usefulness. As 
Samuel has argued, there is no reliable method in which the similarity or the difference of 
things could be tested.34 As analogical reasoning is based on the notion of similarity between 
cases, yet there is no test to determine whether the cases are actually sufficiently similar to 
justify analogical reasoning, some arbitrariness can easily remain in the reasoning process, as 
the arbitrators choose which cases and paragraphs are considered to be analogous with the 
current case, which may lead to ‘cherry-picking’ – choosing the cases they are most familiar 
with or that are supportive of their own stance while ignoring others.35 
Throughout this paper I have utilised analogical reasoning and case law when discussing the 
provisions of the ECT. In essence, the cases referred can be divided into two categories that 
concern: 1) similar or identical concepts of law, e.g. fair and equitable treatment or 
expropriation; or 2) similar broader themes, e.g. the protection of the environment or 
sustainable development. It cannot be overstated that neither case law nor analogies are 
binding to tribunals interpreting and applying the ECT. In fact, I argue throughout this paper 
that the established practice within the ECT regime does not give sufficient significance to 
 
30 Edward Hirsch Levi, ‘An Introduction to Legal Reasoning’ (1948) 15 University of Chicago Law Review 
501, 501-502 
31 Vadi (2015) 139-140 
32 Ibid 17  
33 Chen (2019) 57-62 
34 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Taking Methods Seriously (Part One)’ (2007) 2 J. Comp. L. 94, 104 
35 Vadi (2015) 164 
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environmental aspects in light of the actual provisions of the Treaty itself. Thus, a tribunal 
relying too much on analogical reasoning and non-binding precedence might in fact simply 
be repeating old mistakes. 
Having discussed various aspects of the doctrinal methodology, it is worthwhile to mention 
that at times I steer away from such methodological uniformity. During certain sections of 
this paper, I have considered the policy implications of the legal interpretations and 
arguments presented. In such sections, I have utilised tools from other methodological 
approaches, e.g. a modified version of the classical prisoners’ dilemma – a tool that is used 
mainly in connection with utility and game theory, and thus is useful in discussing the 
economic or policy aspects of a given issue. 
In the following chapter, I set the legal framework, within which the interpretations of the 
ECT are done. This takes place mainly in Chapter 2 under which I discuss the ECT and its 
investment protection provisions on a general level and treaty interpretation. The framework 
of environmental provisions is discussed under Chapter 3 in parallel with interpreting them. 
This structure is chosen, as the interpretation and application of the ECT is usually done in 
the context of investment protection. Thus, even though this paper mainly concerns the 
environmental aspects of the Treaty, the investment protection provisions set the correct 
framework. 
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2. Legal Framework 
2.1. Energy Charter Treaty 
2.1.1. Introduction 
In the late 1980s and culminating in 1989, the Soviet Republics in Eastern and Central 
Europe each overthrew their Moscow-backed governments in a series of events36 also 
referred to as “The End of Communism.”37 While the former communist states were 
preparing for the transition into market economy-based systems38, the Western European 
countries had concerns regarding the diversification of their own long-term energy supplies.39 
These concerns were first combined at the European Council meeting in Dublin on 25 June 
1990, where the Dutch representative presented a memorandum titled “European Energy 
Community”40, the idea of which was in essence to secure the flow of capital to the Eastern 
countries and the flow of energy to the Western countries.41 This memorandum is understood 
to be the beginning of the process towards the European Energy Charter42, adopted at the 
Hague on 16-17 December 1991 (the “Charter”), and later the Energy Charter Treaty, which 
opened for signatures on 17 December 1994.43  
Thus, it is clear that the Treaty was crafted in times of transition, and to meet concrete 
interests both in the West and the East. As can also be seen, the timeline of the process is 
fairly short – from the inception of the idea in 1990, through political declaration in 1991, to 
a binding treaty with over 50 state parties in 1994 was remarkably fast. As a result of the 
pace, the adopted Treaty is rather user-unfriendly and contains some ambiguities. However, 
the alternative may have well been a failure in the negotiations.44 
 
36 A brief timeline of the events: Institutions, ‘1989: The year of revolutions – a look back 20 years on’ 
(European Parliament, 27 August 2009), accessed at 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-
PRESS+20090826STO59792+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> on 27 July 2020 
37 Aline Sierp, ‘Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe 1989-90 – The European Parliament and the 
end of the Cold War’ (2015) European Parliament History Series 20-36 
38 R.F.M. Lubbers, ‘Foreword’ in T.W. Wälde (ed) The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for 
Investment & Trade ((Kluwer Law International Ltd 1996) xiii 
39 Ibid; Sussman (2008) 391-392 
40 Bulletin of the European Communities No 6, Vol 23 1990 13 
41 Tim Maxian Rusche, EU Renewable Electricity Law and Policy – From National Targets to a Common 
Market (Cambridge University Press 2015) 166 
42 The European Energy Charter will be discussed in greater detail under Chapter 3 – although the Charter itself 
is non-binding, the Treaty makes several references to it, thus placing significance to it. 
43 R.F.M. Lubbers (1996) xiii; Bamberger (1996) 2 
44 Bamberger (1996) 2-3 
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The Energy Charter Treaty is a unique and complex45 multilateral investment treaty, which 
solely concerns the energy sector.46 Currently, the Treaty has fifty-three47 signatories and 
contracting parties, mainly countries of Western Europe and of the former Soviet Union, but 
also countries such as Japan and Australia.48 Although the ECT also concerns matters not 
related to investments, it can nevertheless be called an international investment treaty.49 
International law on foreign investments concerns situations where “tangible or intangible 
assets are transferred from one country to another for the purpose of their use in that country 
to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the assets.”50 In other 
words, assets move from one jurisdiction to another. Were there no specific rules to govern 
such situations the host state of the investment could, in principle, nationalise the investment 
with little to no cost.51 Such situation is clearly undesirable for capital exporting states, so 
they have developed legal techniques to protect the interests of their nationals, who may wish 
to avoid the application of host state law and their national courts.52 Below, I discuss some of 
these legal techniques that are incorporated in the ECT. 
 
 
 
45 Bamberger, who acted as the chair of lawyers that participated in the negotiations, described the ECT as a 
complex and un-user-friendly instrument - in addition to the text of the Treaty itself, the ECT framework 
contains several Annexes; Conference Decisions; Understandings; Declarations, The European Energy Charter; 
The International Energy Charter; the Amendment to the Trade-Related Provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty 
of 24 April 1998 and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (“PEEREA”) of 17 
December 1994. Bamberger (1996) 2; www.energycharter.org accessed on 2 March 2020 
46 Bamberger (1996) 1 
47 Including the European Union and Euratom, more on the parties at: www.energycharter.org, accessed 2 
March 2020 
48 Edna Sussman, 'The Energy Charter Treaty's Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to Foster Solutions to 
Global Warming and Promote Sustainable Development' (2008) 14 ILSA J Int'l & Comp 391, 392 
49 Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Energy Charter Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration: Controversial Issues’ (2004) 5 J 
World Investment & Trade 373, 378 
50 M. Sornajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press 2010) 8 
51 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) adopted on 12 
December 1974, by 115 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions, Article 2.1 states that “Every State has and shall freely 
exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural 
resources and economic activities” and further in Article 2.2(c) that “Each State has the right to nationalize, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property…”  
 
Although General Assembly resolutions are not binding on the states per se, they may nevertheless provide a 
basis for the development of law. Thus, the aforementioned General Assembly resolution 3281 may well have 
acted as an incentive for capital exporting states to create specific rules. More on the status of General Assembly 
resolutions: Crawford (2019) 39-40 
 
52 Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty 
(Cambridge University Press 2011) 3-4 
11 
 
2.1.2. Overview of the Protection of Investments under the ECT 
Although the focus of this text is on the environmental aspects53 of the ECT, it is nevertheless 
important to also investigate the aspects of the ECT relating to the protection of investment, 
as this thesis specifically concerns the significance of the environmental aspects in litigation, 
and most, if not all, ECT litigation takes place in investor-state disputes. In this section I 
discuss Articles 10, 13 and 26 of the Treaty, knowledge of which will be of aid when 
discussing litigation techniques under Chapter 4 of the thesis. Literature concerning the ECT 
is often focused on the investment protection aspects of the treaty. Compared to such 
presentations, this section will be kept relatively brief. 
States have several obligations towards investors under the ECT regime. The key obligations 
are found in Articles 10 and 13 of the ECT. Consequently, most of the known disputes also 
concern alleged breaches of these articles.54 There are also no clear thresholds that would 
indubitably prove that either Article 10 or 13 would have been breached, or whether certain 
conduct breaches Article 10 or 13. It is important to note that the investment protection 
clauses only cover legitimate expectations55 and interests of the investors. For example, an 
investor cannot legitimately expect that their illegal activities would be protected under such 
clauses56 or that the host state would cease regulating.57 
 
53 The environmental aspects of the ECT are discussed in length in Chapter 3. 
54 Of the cases where an award has been rendered, over 80% concerned an alleged breach of either of these 
articles based on ECT Secretariat data.  
55 Philip Morris SARL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016) 
[426]: “It clearly emerges from the analysis of the FET standard by investment tribunals that legitimate 
expectations depend on specific undertakings and representations made by the host State to induce investors to 
make an investment. Provisions of general legislation applicable to a plurality of persons or of category of 
persons, do not create legitimate expectations that there will be no change in the law.” 
 
The significance of specific commitments by the host state regarding legitimate expectations has also been 
investigated in several ECT cases, e.g. Blusun S.A., Jean Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Award (27 December 2016), or the Spanish solar cases.  
 
The term “Spanish solar cases” is at times used to refer to a series of investor claims against Spain resulting 
from its changes to the renewable energy incentives program. 
56 Wälde (2004) 387 
57 Rule that has been confirmed in several arbitrations under the ECT. E.g. AES Summit Generation Limited and 
AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. V. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22 and Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award (25 November 2015) [2.27, 7.75].  
 
In the NAFTA case Feldman v. Mexico, which is at times referred to by ECT tribunals, the arbitrators, while 
acknowledging that states have several ways to force a someone out of business, but “At the same time, 
governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the environment, new or 
modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff 
levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be 
achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary 
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Article 10 concerns the promotion, protection and treatment of investments, and it has 12 
paragraphs. The first paragraph, however, contains the core of Article 10: 
“Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for 
Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such 
conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of 
Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments 
shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party 
shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such 
Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by international 
law, including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any 
other Contracting Party.”58 
The six key obligations regarding the standard of treatment and protection of investments that 
are spelt out above are 1) the non-discrimination, 2) fair and equitable treatment, 3) most 
constant protection and security, 4) pacta sunt servanda, 5) treatment no less favourable than 
international law and treaty obligations, and 6) no unreasonable impairment.59 It is clear from 
Article 10 that there is no such rule that would prohibit all state measures that might conflict 
with the interests of investors. Whereas most of the obligations are relatively straightforward, 
the most ambiguous obligation within Article 10 is the fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
standard. Regarding the FET standard, it can be said that Article 10 obligates states to act 
towards their investors in good faith in a manner that is transparent, consistent with due 
process, and not arbitrary, unjust or unfair. Furthermore, a state should maintain legal 
stability60, and must not violate the investors’ legitimate expectations.61 Effectively Article 10 
means that a state must treat foreign investors as they would national actors. States may 
regulate, but such measures must not affect foreign investors discriminately, and state 
 
international law recognizes this.” Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (16 December 2002) [103] 
58 ECT Article 10(1) 
59 Wälde (2004) 380 
60 Elizabeth Whitsitt and Nigel Bankes, 'The Evolution of International Investment Law and Its Application to 
the Energy Sector' (2013) 51 Alta L Rev 207, 223-224 
61 Lise Johnson, 'International Investment Agreements and Climate Change: The Potential for Investor-State 
Conflicts and Possible Strategies for Minimizing It' (2009) 39 Envtl L Rep News & Analysis 11147, 11152-
11153 
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measures must be reasonable. The scope of FET-standard is unclear, especially when 
formulated in an unqualified manner62 as is done in the ECT. 63 However, it is clear that the 
standard is an ‘evolutionary’ one – tribunals interpret FET standard through a contemporary 
lens. They do not try to consider what would have been fair or equitable in the time of 
ratifying the Treaty.64 Practice has shown that FET standard formulated in such way lends 
itself to practically any type of case.65  
Arguably, such open-ended formulation reflects the principle of equity, which is discussed 
below, meaning that the conduct of a state must be fair and equitable towards the investor and 
vice versa, as noted in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) report: 
“The concept of equity and equitable treatment will need to take into account, not 
only the interests of investors, but those of the host State as well, calling for an 
appropriate balance between various legitimate interests involved. The 
appropriateness of the proportionality principle and balancing through partial 
compensation could be explored as possible tools to help in this process.”66  
The significance of equity in general international law is unclear, outside the thus far never-
applied Article 38(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, which allows for the court to decide a case ex 
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.67 Hudson, in his Individual Opinion on The 
Diversion of Water from The Meuse, discussed equity and argued that the tribunals and courts 
have some freedom to consider the principles of equity as part of applicable international 
law.68 Thus, the unqualified formulation of the FET standard in the ECT seems to ascertain 
the status of equity as a treaty rule, rather than a general principle of law.  
It is important to note, that Article 10 obligations are not absolute as they are subject to some 
of the exceptions of Article 24. The legitimacy of state interests may also be relevant in 
 
62 UNCTAD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, (2012 United Nations) 1 
63 ECT Article 10(1): “commitment to accord … fair and equitable treatment.” 
64 Wälde (2004) 385 
65 UNCTAD (2012) 43 
66 Ibid 77 
67 ICJ Statute Article 38(2). Essentially this means that if the parties agree, the ICJ may decide a case solely on 
the basis of what they consider to be fair, rather than rely on sources of law listed in Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute. 
68 PCIJ, Diversion of Water from Meuse (Netherlands. v. Belgium), Judgment (28 June 1937) [321-323] 
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determining whether the article has been breached or not.69 On the other hand, Article 13 is 
much stricter and more absolute, as will be discussed next. 
Article 13 concerns expropriation and states in its first paragraph that: 
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting 
Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 
“Expropriation”) except where such Expropriation is:  
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest;  
(b) not discriminatory;  
(c) carried out under due process of law; and  
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”70 
As can be clearly seen from the article, states retain their sovereign right to expropriate or 
nationalise private property. However, the Treaty sets both material (non-discrimination and 
public interest) and procedural (due process and compensation) limitations to the states’ 
ability to exercise this right. If a given measure or a set of measures taken by a state fulfils the 
criteria of expropriation, then a state must pay compensation.71  
The Treaty is clear that measures that have the same effect as direct expropriation, also called 
indirect expropriation72, trigger the same compensation obligations.73 Yet the Treaty remains 
silent as to what exactly qualifies as either direct or indirect expropriation. However, there 
has been a significant amount of discussion regarding the very question, both in arbitration 
proceedings and academia. Wälde and Kolo, in their somewhat pointed article74, discuss the 
line between a ‘normal’ environmental regulation and a compensable ‘regulatory taking’ 
 
69 E.g. El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award 
(31 October 2011) [372]: 
“Under a FET clause, a foreign investor can expect that the rules will not be changed without justification of an 
economic, social or other nature. Conversely, it is unthinkable that a State could make a general commitment to 
all foreign investors never to change its legislation whatever the circumstances, and it would be unreasonable for 
an investor to rely on such a freeze” (emphasis added). 
70 ECT Article 13(1) 
71 ECT Article 24(1), which concerns exceptions to the treaty provision states that:” This Article shall not apply 
to Article 12, 13 and 29.” Thus, no exceptions apply when a state has expropriated investor’s property. 
72 Wälde (2004) 402-404 
73 ECT Article 13 
74 Wälde and Kolo describe the environmental cause as a “Trojan horse” being used to further socialist attitude 
and to oppose trade and investment liberalisation. Wälde & Kolo (2001) 811-812 
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under the ECT, stating that the balancing process is not easy, but that the environmental 
aspects of the Treaty are suitable to be used in the balancing process.75 
Although the existence of expropriation must be examined case by case, certain factors can 
be deduced regarding expropriation: it is not necessary for a state to actually assume 
ownership of the investors’ assets for there to be expropriation76; for there to be expropriation 
without nationalisation, the value of the investment must be significantly diminished due to 
state measures77, and therefore even an otherwise drastic drop in value does not necessarily 
constitute expropriation; and, even a perfectly legitimate regulation for laudatory purposes 
may constitute compensable expropriation, if the costs should be borne by the community, 
rather than by the investor.78 
Article 26 is the basis for Investor-State Dispute settlement under ECT and contains an  
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) clause79, which are a relative novelty in 
international law as they bestow direct rights to individuals80, and they allow investors to 
utilise international arbitration against the host states for alleged breaches of obligations. 
ISDS-clauses are now a key feature of foreign investment law, a recent large sample survey 
by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) found that 93% of 
bilateral investment treaties81 contain language on ISDS.82 Below, I have presented a 
somewhat simplified picture of Article 26 and its contents. 
Article 26 concerns the settlement of disputes between investors and contracting parties. In 
paragraph 3 of the Article, states give their “unconditional consent to the submission of a 
dispute to international arbitration or conciliation in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article.”83 Thus, there is no doubt on whether ISDS is available to investors under the ECT in 
 
75 Ibid 817 
76 Wälde (2004) 402: “It is now generally recognized that governmental action can constitute a compensable 
expropriation even if no formal “taking” and transfer of ownership has taken place.” 
77 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. V. Republic of Hungary, Award (23 September 
2010) [14.3.1] 
78 Wälde & Kolo (2001) 826-827 
79 ISDS is a highly controversial subject in international law for several reasons that fall outside the scope of this 
thesis. For example, Martti Koskenniemi has argued that ISDS-clauses in agreements between developed states 
essentially transfer regulatory powers from the government to the foreign investors. More on this: Martti 
Koskenniemi, Statement to the Finnish Parliament regarding CETA (13 March 2018) (in Finnish), accessed at 
<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/JulkaisuMetatieto/Documents/EDK-2018-AK-176559.pdf> on 3 March 
2020 
80 Wälde (2004) 378 
81 Sample size of 1,660 BITs. 
82 Pohl, J., K. Mashigo and A. Nohen, ‘Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements: 
A Large Sample Survey’ (2012) OECD Working Papers on International Investment, OECD Publishing 7 
83 ECT Article 26(3)(a) 
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general, however, as the focus of this thesis is in the environmental aspects of the Treaty, the 
matter becomes slightly less clear. According to paragraph 1 of Article 26, the ISDS-clause 
only applies to disputes concerning an alleged breach under Part III of the ECT.84 Part III 
concerns investment promotion and protection, and covers Articles 10-17, and therefore, 
clearly excludes certain alleged breaches from its scope, e.g. breaches of environmental 
provisions found under Article 19 in Part IV. This wording does not, however, mean that 
environmental matters could not constitute a part of a dispute, as it remains a plausible 
scenario that an investor alleges state measures to protect the environment would breach their 
rights under Part III of the ECT. In such cases, environmental aspects will naturally be 
considered. This conclusion is further supported by paragraph 6 of Article 26, which states 
that: 
“A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in 
accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international 
law.”85 
The above paragraph further reminds the interpreters of the ECT that it is to be applied as a 
whole and not in isolation from the rest of the corpus of international law. 
The wording of paragraph 1 of Article 26 does, however, mean that if an investor alleges that 
a contracting party is in breach of Article 19 for instance, but not any of the Part III articles, 
they would not be able to bring forward a case under Article 26 of the ECT.  
Above I have presented an outline of the clauses most often invoked in ISDS proceedings 
under the ECT. These articles, and their relationship to environmental matters, will be 
returned upon under Chapter 4, while discussing litigation techniques. Below, I discuss the 
principles of treaty interpretation. 
2.2. Treaty Interpretation 
2.2.1. “Rules” of Treaty Interpretation – Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 
Any document, treaties included, drafted by humans gives rise to some doubt or ambiguity 
regarding its meaning, content or scope and in order to solve these issues, a document 
 
84 ECT Article 26(1) 
85 ECT Article 26(6) 
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requires interpretation.86 A treaty can be interpreted without application, but any application 
of a treaty presupposes interpretation.87 The general rule of treaty interpretation was codified 
over 50 years ago in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT” or “Vienna 
Convention”)88, yet the subject remains of high interest in literature89 with many of the same 
questions regarding schools of interpretation still relevant.90  
The VCLT contains the general “rule” of interpretation in its Articles 31-33.91 The quotation 
marks surrounding the word “rule” are to show that there is no strict rule that could be 
applied to all interpretative issues.92 Nevertheless, the drafters of the VCLT, despite at times 
doubting whether such rules even exist93,  managed to identify certain elements, which are 
now contained in the articles mentioned above.  
The first paragraph of Article 31 reads as follows: 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”94 
The paragraph lays out the principles of 1) good faith, flowing from the maxim of pacta sunt 
servanda; 2) that ordinary meaning is given to the terms of the treaty, which serves as the 
basis of textual approach; and 3) that the above does not happen in the abstract, but in the 
light of the context, and object and purpose of the treaty.95 
The second paragraph sheds light to the point 3) above: 
 
86 Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 31. General rule of interpretation’ in Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer 2012) 522  
87 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: Articles 27-29 of the Vienna Draft 
Convemtion on the Law of Treaties’ (1968) 9 Va J Int'l L 1, 7-8 
88 VCLT Arts 31 and 32, which have since been widely recognised as reflecting the status of customary 
international law. E.g. Crawford (2019) 366 
89 Michael Waibel, ‘Demystifying the Art of Interpretation’ (2011) EJIL Vol. 22 No 2 571 
90 E.g. Oliver Morse, ‘Schools of Approach to the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1960) 9 Cath. U. L. Rev. 36, 39-
42; and Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Olufemi Elias,’Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (2005 Eleven 
International Publishing) 218-221. The works have 45 years in between them, yet both identify the same 
primary schools of interpretation. 
91 It is notable, that the VCLT and the commentary uses the word “rule” rather than its plural “rules”, which is to 
mean that its application is a single combined operation. Thus, all aspects of article 31 ought to be applied when 
it is invoked in interpretation of a treaty provision.  
Crawford (2019) 367 
92 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 vol. II 218-219 
93 Ibid 
94 VCLT Art 31(1) 
95 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 vol. II 221 
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“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.”96 
The paragraph aims to clarify what the context of a given treaty is comprised of. It is clear 
that the preamble and annexes to the treaty are comprised in the context of a treaty97 and the 
paragraph also assigns significance to other instruments made in connection to the treaty and 
which are accepted as being connected to the treaty, in setting the context of the treaty. It is of 
particular importance that preambles are to be concerned in the interpretation of treaties – the 
preamble part of a treaty might often seem declaratory rather than binding. Yet, the explicit 
acknowledgement that the preamble is to be given interpretative weight means that the 
operative parts of a treaty should not be given a meaning that would be contradictory to the 
preamble. 
The third paragraph adds further factors that are to be considered in the interpretation: 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty;  
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
understanding of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” 
Points (a) and (b) make good sense – the contracting parties’ subsequent practice offers a 
clear implication of their intention and understanding regarding the treaty. Lord McNair, who 
was a sceptic regarding the value of the rules of interpretation,98 nevertheless describes the 
 
96 VCLT Art 31(2) 
97 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 vol. II 221 
98 McNair, Law of Treaties, 1961, (Oxford University Press 1961) 366 
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interpretative effect of subsequent practice as worthy to be called a rule and as good sense 
and good law.99 Point (c) regarding any relevant rules of international law is a complex 
one.100 Its aim is to maintain coherence in international law, as any situation may have 
several applicable laws.101 Essentially the reference to applicable rules of international law 
makes sure that treaties are not interpreted in isolation from the broader context.102  
In the fourth and final paragraph it is stated that special meaning can be given to a term, if it 
is established that parties have intended so.103 Assigning special meaning to certain terms is a 
common practice in treaties. Usually treaties are very clear about when this is done – treaties 
often include several definitions and when certain terms in treaties have a capitalised first 
letter, it usually implicates that a special meaning has been given for the term within the 
treaty itself. Naturally it is possible to assign special meaning in other ways too, but in such 
situations the evidence of special meaning would be less evident. 
Should the general rule of Article 31 leave the meaning of a treaty provision ambiguous, 
obscure, or lead to an absurd or unreasonable result, supplementary means of interpretation 
may be applied, as allowed by Article 32 of the VCLT: 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”104 
Whereas the aspects of Article 31 must always be considered when the article is applied in 
interpretation, the Article 32 may only be applied in situations where the application of 
Article 31 leads to unsatisfactory results. When considering the preparatory works, it may 
yield information at times on the intent of the drafters of a treaty regarding certain provisions. 
 
99 Ibid 424 
100 More on Article 31(3)(c): Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission Finalized by 
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’ (ILC 2006) 206-243 
101 Crawford (2019) 368-369 
102 Ibid 
103 VCLT Art 31(4) 
104 VCLT Art 32 
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However, in the context of the ECT, the usefulness of the travaux préparatoires is highly 
questionable.105 The same holds true to multilateral treaties more widely as well.106 
Article 33 concerns the interpretation of treaties that are authenticated in two or more 
languages. The first paragraph of the article is relevant for the ECT, and reads as follows: 
“When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in 
case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.”107 
The ECT is rather clear on this particular matter, as in its Article 50 it is stated that the Treaty 
is signed in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, and that each of these 
texts is equally authentic.108 This adds a further layer of complication to the interpretation of 
the ECT. As the Treaty framework, which, as established, is a complicated whole, was 
drafted in a relatively quick schedule, and each of the six languages is equally authentic, there 
are bound to be differences between them, and no clear way to decide which version should 
prevail.109 
Above I have briefly discussed the VCLT rules of treaty interpretation, which are commonly 
considered to be customary international law.110 Despite this status, the VCLT Articles 31 
and 32 are actually merely comprised of factors that are to be considered when interpreting a 
treaty. VCLT remains quiet as to what significance these factors are to be given and what is 
their relationship to each other, albeit highlighting the significance of the text. In fact, if 
solely the VCLT rule of interpretation is followed, the interpreter may be no closer to a 
definite interpretation than they were before the exercise, and another interpreter may reach 
the polar opposite interpretation through the application of the exact same set of rules.111 
 
105 Roe and Happold have described the preparatory works of the ECT as “difficult to access, obscure and 
unhelpful”, and further note that the value of a single delegation’s papers is unknown, and that the most difficult 
issues are commonly tackled “off the record”, thus leaving the preparatory works silent on such matters. Roe & 
Happold (2011) 32 
106 G.G. Fitzmaurice, 'Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points' (1951) 28 Brit YB Int'l L 3-4 
107 VCLT Art 33(1) 
108 ECT Article 50 
109 A comparison between these authentic texts could well yield several differences in tone or in substance, 
which could have effect in the application of the Treaty. E.g. in Article 24(3)(c) the English version speaks of 
“public order”, whereas the French version uses the term “l’ordre public”, a distinction which might lead to 
different interpretations, and which will be investigated under Chapter 4 when discussing Article 24.  
110 Crawford (2019) 366 
111 McNair (1961) 365; Although McNair naturally does not discuss the VCLT per se, the section concerns “so-
called rules of interpretation” – a category under which VCLT certainly falls under. 
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Thus, it seems, that there must be more to the interpretation of treaties than the VCLT.112 
Below, I discuss some of the key methods, or schools, of treaty interpretation on which the 
VCLT remains silent. 
2.2.2. Interpretation Beyond the Vienna Convention 
The International Law Commission (“ILC)”), in its commentary to the draft articles on the 
Law of Treaties, notes that the identified principles and maxims of treaty interpretation “are 
for the most part, principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to assist in 
appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended to attach to the expressions 
that they employed in a document”. The ILC further adds that “Even when a possible 
occasion for their application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but 
depends on the conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in the particular 
circumstances of the case. In other words, recourse to many of these principles is 
discretionary rather than obligatory and the interpretation of documents is to some extent an 
art, not an exact science.”113 Thus, it seems clear that the VCLT was never supposed to be the 
final say on treaty interpretation, but rather a collection of the aspects that could be agreed 
upon.114 As VCLT did not create an absolute canon of interpretation, it is worthwhile to look 
into the pre-Vienna schools of treaty interpretation, as these approaches remain valid. 
Essentially three main schools of interpretation can be identified: textual; the intention of the 
parties; and teleological.115 These different approaches to interpretation are also 
acknowledged in the ILC commentary to the draft articles on Law of Treaties, which states 
that  
“Jurists also differ to some extent in their basic approach to the interpretation of 
treaties according to the relative weight which they give to: (a) The text of the treaty 
as the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; (b) The intentions of the 
 
112 Alain Pellet, ‘Canons of Interpretation under the Vienna Convention’ in Klingler, Parkhomenko & Salonidis 
(eds) Between the Lines of the Vienna Convention? Canons and Other Principles of Interpretation in Public 
International Law (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 6 
113 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 vol. II 218 
114 In fact, the agreed upon text and approach of the VCLT was also challenged, e.g. the US delegation 
challenged the hierarchy of articles 31 and 32, and suggested a more contextual, rather than textual, approach to 
treaty interpretation. See A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 149 
 
115G.G. Fitzmaurice, 'Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain 
Other Treaty Points' (1951) 28 Brit YB Int'l L 1; Morse (1960) 39 
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parties as a subjective element distinct from the text; and (c) The declared or apparent 
objects and purposes of the treaty.”116 
The above segment is a solid explanation of the various schools of interpretation: The 
textualist school, as the name hints, confines itself to the actual text of the treaty, and is the 
one most embraced by the ILC in the drafting of the Vienna Convention, and by the ICJ in its 
practice.117 The starting premise of the textual school is difficult to argue with: Any 
interpretation exercise should begin with the actual text118, and if the text is sufficiently clear, 
also end there.119 However, this is rarely the situation, as formulated by Wheaton:  
“Such is the inevitable imperfection and ambiguity of all human language, that the 
mere words alone of any writing, literally expounded, will go a very little way 
towards explaining its meaning.”120 
Thus, the textual approach alone is rarely sufficient. This is also acknowledged in the Vienna 
Convention, which calls for interpretation in the proper context and in the light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose.121 This formulation steers towards the teleological school122 of 
interpretation, an approach in which the object and purpose of the treaty are given more 
interpretative value. In the teleological approach, the object and purpose of a treaty must be 
found within the treaty itself, or in other words, the treaty is interpreted primarily with 
reference to itself.123 Particular support for the teleological approach can be found in the 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 19, which reads as follows: 
“A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which it is intended to 
serve. The historical background of the treaty, travaux préparatoires, the 
circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these 
circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying 
 
116 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 vol. II 218 
117 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966 vol. II 220-221 
118 As expressed in various documents and by various authors, e.g. Harvard Research in International Law, Law 
of Treaties in Supplement to the American Journal of International Law Vol. 29, (1935) 947; G.G. Fitzmaurice 
(1951) 7; McNair (1961) 365; VCLT Art 31(1). 
119 This was already established by Vattel, who formulated it in the following way: “It is not permissible to 
interpret what has no need of interpretation.” See Harvard Research, (1935) 940. 
120 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (8th Edition, 1866 Carey, Lea and Blanchard) 365 
121 VCLT Art 31(1) 
122 The teleological approach can be seen as the application of ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the rule of 
effectiveness, which essentially means that a treaty should be interpreted in a way that does not deprive it of 
meaning. See G.G. Fitzmaurice, (1951) 8 
123 G.G. Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points' (1957) 33 Brit YB Int'l L 209 
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the provisions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is 
being made, are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the 
treaty is intended to serve.”124 
The above segment clearly takes a very different approach to treaty interpretation than the 
one agreed to in the VCLT. Yet it signals the significance of the teleological school of 
interpretation. The teleological approach is best suited for multilateral treaties and 
conventions.125 It must be noted that the teleological approach, if taken too far, has the 
tendency to be a legislative, rather than an interpretative exercise, which can be seen either as 
problematic or not, depending on whether the parties wish for the tribunal to “improve” the 
treaty text or not.126 McNair is among those who find this approach problematic, and 
formulates the argument of the party invoking teleological approach (‘rule of effectiveness’) 
as “If you do not construe the treaty in the way that I submit to you to be correct, this treaty 
will fail in its object” and adds that “many treaties fail – and rightly fail – in their object by 
reason of the words used, and tribunals are properly reluctant to step in and modify or 
supplement the language of the treaty.”127 This is due to McNair’s take on interpretation, 
which 
“[C]an be described as the duty of giving effect to the expressed intention of the 
parties, that is, their intention as expressed in the words used by them in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances.”128 
The formulation used by McNair clearly places less significance on the object of the treaty, 
and more on the intent of the parties, which brings us to the last major school of 
interpretation. The intent of the parties school shares the same premise as the teleological 
school, namely that context must be added to the text itself. However, instead of looking into 
the treaty itself, the intent school places greater interpretative value into the background, 
surrounding circumstances and the preparatory works of the treaty129 - according to the 
school, the only legitimate object is to give effect to the intentions of the parties.130 If it can 
be established that all the parties to the treaty have a same intention regarding the treaty, it is 
evident that their intention should be given effect, even if it is contrary to the words used in 
 
124 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 19, See Harvard Research (1935) 937 
125 G.G. Fitzmaurice (1951) 2; Morse (1960) 41 
126 G.G. Fitzmaurice (1957) 207-208 
127 McNair (1961) 383 
128 Ibid 365, emphasis added 
129 Morse (1960) 39-40 
130 G.G. Fitzmaurice (1951) 1 
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the text. However, it is questionable, especially with multilateral treaties such as the ECT, 
whether a common and comprehensive intention shared by all parties can ever be deciphered. 
Fitzmaurice formulated this problem in the following way: 
“There is, however, now a school of thought which … does query whether the 
continued relevance of intention is anything much more than a pious fiction in the 
general multilateral field. The haste and confusion in which multilateral conventions 
are often drawn up; the mixed aims, motives, interest, and ideologies of the countries 
represented at the drafting conference; the fact that many of those States which took a 
share in the framing of the convention subsequently fail to become parties to it…”131 
The above is an extreme take on the insignificance of the intention of the parties in the 
interpretation of multilateral treaties – a more moderate view would allow the intention of 
parties some value, if other approaches of interpretation lead to unsatisfactory results.132 It is, 
however, noteworthy that the critique presented by Fitzmaurice concerning the common 
intentions of the parties fits the ECT well. The ECT was drafted in a quick schedule, and 
several countries that did not become parties to it nevertheless participated in the drafting. 
Above I have discussed some of the various ‘rules’ and ‘schools’ of treaty interpretation and 
now, something can be said of how they are applied in this paper. It is evident that as there is 
no strict rule of treaty interpretation, the above discussion rather presents logical tools to aid 
in the task. As such, one does not have to submit oneself to any one of these approaches 
wholly, but instead use them to support each other in a logical and reasonable way. As I have 
interpreted a multilateral treaty – the ECT – I have mostly relied on the schools of textual and 
teleological interpretation.133 The intent of the parties of the ECT could potentially be 
impossible to decipher adequately. In my interpretation process, I have first aimed to 
decipher the object and purpose of the ECT by investigating the texts of the treaty and its 
framework. Secondly, I have examined the actual words and clauses of the treaty and applied 
them in the light of the object and purpose. In other words, I have followed the VCLT 
guidelines of interpretation, while giving the teleological approach more relative weight. 
 
131 Ibid 3-4 
132 Ibid; This is also reflected in the VCLT Article 32(1). 
133 However, I avoid making an argument that would rely on the claim that any application based on an 
interpretation different from the one presented here would “defeat the object and purpose of the ECT”. Such 
argumentation is too absolute and fails to consider the more nuanced nature of the ECT, or any other instrument 
for that matter. 
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3. Energy Charter Treaty and the Environment 
3.1. Introduction 
The Energy Charter Treaty is often seen as detrimental to the protection of the environment 
as the Treaty itself does not explicitly treat fossil fuel -based energy in a different way than it 
would treat renewable energy. Furthermore, the arbitrators have not had many possibilities to 
discuss the environmental aspects of the Treaty. There have been only a few public cases, 
where arbitrators have, in their award, explicitly relied on or stated that either of the parties 
relied on the environmental aspects of the Treaty.134 Over this chapter, I show that such a 
situation is unwarranted;135 The environmental provisions of the ECT can and should have 
more significance in any situation where the Treaty is either interpreted or applied. I have 
applied the aforementioned schools of interpretation, in conjunction with the Vienna 
Convention rules of interpretation, to support this claim. Particular weight was given to the 
teleological and textual schools of interpretation. The case could also be made through other 
interpretative approaches, e.g. the approach of restrictive interpretation. However, the 
significance of this approach has been lesser since the adoption of the VCLT.136 
3.2. Object and Purpose of the ECT 
3.2.1. The European Energy Charter 
The Charter itself is a non-binding political declaration. The Energy Charter Treaty, however, 
ought to be interpreted through the lens of the Charter137 as stated in ECT Article 2, titled as 
the Purpose of the Treaty: 
 
134 E.g. Blusun S.A., Jean Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3 
(see Section 3.4 below); NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, Award (12 March 2019) [408]; and Stadtwerke München 
GmbH, AS 3 Beteiligungs GmbH; Andasol 3 Kraftwerks GmbH; Andasol Fonds GmbH & Co. KG; Ferranda 
GmbH; Ferrostaal Industrial Projects GmbH; RWE Innogy GmbH; RheinEnergie AG;Marquesado Solar S.L. v. 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/1, Award (2 December 2019) [53] 
135 However, the relatively little attention that the environmental aspects have gotten may have more to do with 
the hesitation of parties to emphasize environmental obligations – reliance on environmental aspects of the ECT 
would entail that the actor truly meets its environmental obligations broadly, and not just in the particular case.  
136 Restrictive interpretation is an approach to interpretation, according to which treaties are to be interpreted 
with the assumption that states have intended to retain as wide sovereign rights as possible within the treaty 
context. The VCLT, however, makes no references to this approach. 
137 As Klabbers has stated regarding deciphering the object and purpose of complex treaty frameworks, much 
depends on the actual terms. In ECT context, the terms used seem to support the inclusion of the Charter in the 
interpretative process. See Jan Klabbers, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’ (1997) 
The Finnish Yearbook of International Law VIII 138, 153-155 
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“This Treaty establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation 
in the energy field, based on the complementarities and mutual benefits, and in 
accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter.”138 
Thus, it seems that the Charter offers the interpretative key to finding out the object and 
purpose of the Treaty, which forms one of the key components of treaty interpretation.139 The 
Charter has particular significance in the teleological approach, but also in the textual 
approach, as the Treaty makes a direct reference to it. The Charter sets out the objectives of 
the Treaty, namely creating a favourable climate to the operation of enterprises and flow of 
investments, while maximising the efficiency of production and use of energy, and 
minimising environmental problems on an acceptable economic basis.140 The Charter, 
although placing importance on all objectives, does seem to pay particular attention to 
environmental matters. Already in the Preamble, the Charter places the importance of energy 
efficiency and protection of the environment on a higher level than the importance of trade 
and investment -related aspects. The difference in importance is noticeable when comparing 
the preambular paragraphs with each other. 
On sustainable development, energy efficiency and the protection of the environment, the 
Preamble states: 
“Convinced of the essential importance of efficient energy systems in the production, 
conversion, transport, distribution and use of energy for security of supply and for the 
protection of the environment” and;  
“Willing to do more to attain the objectives of security of supply and efficient 
management and use of resources, and to utilise fully the potential for environmental 
improvement, in moving towards sustainable development” 
Whereas on trade and investment, the Preamble uses considerably weaker language: 
“Determined to establish closer, mutually beneficial commercial relations and 
promote energy investments” and; 
 
138 ECT Article 2, emphasis added 
139 VCLT Article 31 
140 Charter, Title 1: Objectives 
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“Convinced of the importance of promoting free movement of energy products and of 
developing an efficient international energy infrastructure in order to facilitate the 
development of market-based trade in energy”.141 
This formulation of the importance of interests alone – whether it is essential or not – casts 
doubt on the typical characterisation of the object and purpose of the ECT as to being solely 
economical.142 The Charter also lists several examples as to how these principles and 
objectives are to be reached under Title I: Objectives: 
 “Energy efficiency and environmental protection, which will imply: 
- creating mechanisms and conditions for using energy as economically and 
efficiently as possible, including, as appropriate, regulatory and market-based 
instruments; 
- promotion of an energy mix designed to minimise negative environmental 
consequences in a cost-effective way through: 
(i) market-oriented energy prices which more fully reflect environmental 
costs and benefits; 
(ii) efficient and coordinated policy measures related to energy; and 
(iii) use of new and renewable energies and clean technologies.”143 
These implied actions offer valuable insight regarding the interpretation of the Treaty itself. 
The Treaty is to be applied in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Charter, 
and the Charter has laid out several key measures that would promote the fulfilment of its 
environmental objectives. The ones which are of the most practical importance, and can be 
 
141 Charter, Preamble, emphasis added 
142 E.g. Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 
2008) [165-167], where the tribunal found the object and purpose to be a balance between protection of foreign 
investments and the promotion of the economic development of the Contracting Parties. Despite stating that 
taking into account the totality of the Treaty’s purpose is appropriate, the tribunal remains silent on the 
environmental aspects. 
 
Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., CAUC Holding Company Ltd. V. The Government of Mongolia, 
MonAtm LLC, PCA Case No. 2011-09, Decision on Jurisdiction (25 July 2012) [426-427], where the tribunal 
found the object and purpose of the ECT to be the creation of a predictable legal framework for investment in 
the energy field. 
 
In NextEra v. Spain, the respondent goes as far as to explicitly argue that the protection of the environment is of 
minor importance and outside the scope of the object and purpose of the ECT. Although the tribunal does not 
explicitly state their own finding as regards the object and purpose of the ECT, they nevertheless ruled against 
the respondent. See NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, Award (12 March 2019) [408] 
143 Charter, 1.3.  
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derived from the section above, are 1) explicit allowance of regulatory instruments for 
environmental protection144; 2) market-orientated approach should fully reflect the 
environmental costs and benefits; and 3) an explicitly stated preference for renewable energy 
sources.  
As the Energy Charter Treaty has made an explicit reference to the objectives and principles 
of the European Energy Charter, it seems clear, that the contents of the Charter should be 
utilised when deducing the object and purpose of the Treaty. Above, I have presented the 
Charter’s key sections regarding the environment, which establish that environmental aspects 
ought to be considered whenever applying the Treaty. Below, I have discussed the provisions 
of the Treaty itself.  
3.2.2. Significance of Preambles 
The preambles to treaties have an important role in treaty interpretation145, and in particular 
aid in deciphering the object and purpose of a treaty.146 The preambles of various treaties 
have in fact been used as interpretative aids by several bodies, including the ICJ147 and, 
perhaps in a more relevant way, the Appellate Body of the WTO, which in its landmark US-
Shrimp case held that: 
“[T]he preamble attached to the WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to that 
Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of 
environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy […] As this 
preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we 
believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreement 
annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994.”148 
 
144 The ECT itself does not explicitly say that states would have a “right to regulate”. However, several 
abovementioned arbitration cases have stated that states retain their right to regulate and, furthermore, several 
parties to the ECT, e.g. EU and its member states, wish to alter the Treaty so that it would explicitly contain the 
right to regulate. See Energy Charter Secretariat, CCDEC 2019 08 STR, Brussels, 6 October 2019, 2, 14-15. 
145 This is codified in VCLT Art. 31(2) 
146 ICJ, The Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J Reports 1951, 23-24; 
Klabbers (1997) 156  
147 E.g. ICJ, Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants 
(Netherlands v. Sweden) (Judgment) (28 November 1958) 67, in which the ICJ stated that ‘The 1902 
Convention, as indicated by its preamble, was designed to “lay down common provisions to govern the 
guardianship of infants”’. 
148 WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of the Appellate 
Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R [130, 153], emphasis added. 
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The Appellate Body’s finding above is based on a section of a preambular paragraph, which 
states that: 
“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should 
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and 
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development”149 
It is noteworthy, that the paragraph in question is the only one in the WTO Agreement 
referring to the environment, and it also aims to strike a balance between the trade aspects, as 
is evident from the first half of the paragraph. Nevertheless, the WTO Appellate Body found 
that this single reference established an awareness on the importance of environmental 
protection and that it reflects the intentions of the negotiators. In contrast, the Preamble to the 
Energy Charter Treaty, which is discussed below, seems to consider the environmental 
aspects considerably more, as it has several paragraphs dedicated solely to environmental 
aspects. 
3.2.3. The Preamble to the Energy Charter Treaty 
The Preamble to the ECT contains 15 paragraphs, which cover a wide range of goals and 
ideals of the parties to the Treaty.150 The first five preambular paragraphs effectively recall 
earlier political declarations, with paragraph 1 referring to the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe and paragraphs 2-5 to the European Energy Charter, further emphasizing the 
Charter’s significance as an interpretative aid. The next few paragraphs list out the principles 
 
149 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 
I.L.M 114 (1994), Preamble, emphasis added. 
150 It could be argued that such a wide Preamble highlights a weakness of the so-called treaty interpretation 
rules, as support for almost any position could be found from a treaty text, possibly, and often, leading to a 
situation where prominent treaty interpreters reach the opposite conclusions, which begs the question of whether 
the rules are actually functioning. More on this e.g. Jan Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ in M. Fitzmaurice, 
O. Elias & P. Merkouris (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 
Years on (2010 Brill Nijhoff) 33 
This apparent weakness of the VCLT rules, however, is not of issue at this time. In this section, I am still 
arguing that the ECT can be interpreted in a greener way in contrast to the currently dominating interpretative 
focus on the investment aspects of the Treaty. 
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related to the WTO, trade and, the treatment of investors. In particular, the language of the 
paragraph concerning the treatment of investors is quite strong: 
“Affirming that Contracting Parties attach the utmost importance to the effective 
implementation of full national treatment and most favoured nation treatment…”151 
The above paragraph, if considered alone, could lead to the impression that the ECT is mostly 
concerned with the treatment of investors, which, frankly, has been the case in several 
arbitration proceedings under the ECT. However, it is striking that the Preamble contains 
several paragraphs that exclusively concern environmental matters 152, of which three are of 
particular importance. 
Firstly, the preambular paragraph 12 reads in the following way: 
“Recognising the necessity for the most efficient exploration, production, conversion, 
storage, transport, distribution and use of energy.” 
The language of the above paragraph is significant for several reasons. Energy efficiency is a 
key element in the protection of the environment in the ECT context and closely related to the 
concept of sustainable development.153 Using the language of necessity to describe its 
importance speaks volumes on the significance of the matter.154 Further, the paragraph 
utilises the term most effective. As the most effective method for various actions, e.g. the 
production or use of energy, changes constantly, it is arguable, that the use of such language 
suggests that the parties intended for the treaty to have an evolving meaning. The ICJ has 
confirmed the possibility of evolutionary interpretation of treaties in the Case concerning the 
River San Juan, where the Court stated: 
“…[W]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily 
having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and 
where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing 
 
151 ECT, Preambular paragraph 6 
152 Clare Shine lists the preambular paragraphs 12-15 as exclusively concerning environmental matters. Clare 
Shine, ‘Environmental Protection Under the Energy Charter Treaty’ in T.W. Wälde (ed) (1996) 521 
153 Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA), Preamble & 
Article 1 
154 When discussing state responsibility, which of course is a different context, the state of necessity has a very 
high threshold, which, if met, allows for a state to digress from its international obligations. 
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duration’, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those 
terms to have an evolving meaning.”155 
The ECT is of continuing duration, which allows for an evolutionary interpretation of some 
of its aspects – arguably even more so regarding its environmental aspects, as the field of 
international environmental law is among the most rapidly evolving fields of law.156 
Secondly, in preambular paragraph 13, it is stated that: 
“Recalling the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, and other 
international environmental agreements with energy-related aspects.” 
This paragraph reflects the VCLT Article 31(3)(c) by referring to other relevant rules of 
international law, and the significance of it is that it broadens the range of interpretative aids 
by referring to international environmental agreements. It is clear that no claim can be made 
under the auspices of the ECT for a breach of e.g. the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, but such instruments can nevertheless be utilised in the interpretation of 
ECT disputes.157 According to Shine, it evokes the two most notable forms of environmental 
threats arising from generating energy from fossil fuels, although the paragraph does not say 
so explicitly, namely global warming158 and acidification.159  
Thus, based on the wording of the paragraph, it seems that the negotiators of the ECT have 
considered international environmental agreements to fall within the scope of relevant rules 
of international law, which further strengthens the argument that environmental matters 
cannot be ignored while interpreting or applying the Treaty. 
Lastly, in the final preambular paragraph it is stated that: 
“Recognizing the increasingly urgent need for measures to protect the environment, 
including the decommissioning of energy installations and waste disposal, and for 
internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for these purposes.” 
 
155 ICJ, Case concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), 
(Judgment) (13 July 2009) [66–67] 
156 Sands et al (2018) 50-51 
157 However, a widespread application of international environmental conventions as interpretative aids falls 
outside the scope of this paper. 
158 Although Climate Change would be a more contemporary term. 
159 Clare Shine (1996) 521 
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The language of the paragraph is plain and strong –  an “increasingly urgent need for 
measures to protect the environment” does not leave much room for ambiguity on whether 
the protection of the environment is a legitimate goal of national or international policy, in 
particular when compared with the language and application of the WTO Agreement 
discussed above. Secondly, the paragraph states that the measures to protect the environment 
may include the decommissioning of energy installations. Such language offers support for 
even the strictest measures to protect the environment, up to, and including, the closures of 
functioning installations. However, whereas this section offers support for the legitimacy of 
such actions, it does not offer states a waterproof defence against expropriation claims, which 
would quite likely follow a national measure to decommission an energy installation160, as it 
is not significant whether expropriation was done for laudable goals or not. The language 
used rather lowers the threshold of a public interest required for lawful expropriation under 
article 13 and offers support to states responding to Article 10 claims. The last part of the 
paragraph is somewhat unfortunate from the environmental point of view - it seems to be 
softening the already soft environmental obligations by placing the burden of creating such 
objectives and criteria to the international level rather than national. Such formulation would 
seemingly allow for states to postpone action until there are such internationally agreed 
factors in place and, on the other hand, for investors to argue against national measures that 
are stricter than those agreed internationally. This, however, seems unlikely. Despite the 
language at the very end, the paragraph as a whole still takes a powerful stance in favour of 
stricter measures for the protection of the environment, while coming short of actually 
obligating states to any specific conduct. 
3.2.4. Summary 
Above I have discussed the sections of the Energy Charter Treaty that would offer the most 
insight regarding the object and purpose of the treaty, namely the Preamble and the Charter, 
as explicitly allowed by Article 2 of the Treaty. I have focused on the environmental aspects 
of the Charter and Preamble – both contain matters relating to trade and investment as well. 
That is to say, the sole object and purpose of the Energy Charter Treaty is by no means the 
protection of the environment. However, as can be seen from the extensive references 
 
160 E.g. Vattenfall v. Germany (I) & Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall GmbH, Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy GmbH, 
Kernkraftwerk Krümmel GmbH & Co. oHG, Kernkraftwerk Brunsbüttel GmbH & Co. oHG v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 (“Vattenfall v. Germany (II)”) both concern measures less strict than 
decommission, and yet in both cases arbitration proceedings were initiated. 
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relating to the protection of the environment in the ECT framework, it is evident that it 
nevertheless forms a prominent part of the object and purpose.  
The arbitration tribunals, and the parties to the dispute as well, applying the ECT often tend 
to simplify the object and purpose to solely consider the investment aspects of the Treaty, as 
discussed above. This is arguably a misinterpretation of the Treaty, as it would effectively 
make large parts of the ECT framework meaningless.161 Thus, the object and purpose of the 
Energy Charter Treaty should be understood to be the promotion of long-term cooperation in 
the energy field, based on both the promotion and protection of investments and the 
protection of the environment.162 This formulation of the object and purpose of the ECT also 
has some support in arbitration practice. In Eiser Infrastucture Limited and Energia Solar 
Luxembourg S.À.R.I. v. Kingdom of Spain (“Eiser v. Spain”), the tribunal, while setting the 
factual background, couples the purpose of the ECT with Article 19 provisions addressing the 
environmental aspects of energy development163 although more often the tribunals fail to 
consider the environmental aspects of the Treaty. 
3.3. Environmental Aspects of the Energy Charter Treaty 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Having established that the object and purpose of the ECT includes environmental matters as 
well those relating to investments, I now turn my attention to the operative parts of the Treaty 
focusing on the environment, namely Articles 18, 19 and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency 
and Related Environmental Aspects (“PEEREA”). In this chapter, I have discussed what the 
parties to the Treaty actually have the right to, or are obliged to, do regarding the 
environment. In this section, I have mostly relied on a textual interpretation of the Treaty, or, 
 
161 This would be problematic keeping in mind the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the rule of 
effectiveness. Although it is questionable whether this constitutes an actual rule (McNair (1961) 383), it seems 
plausible as treaties are to be interpreted as a whole (Fitzmaurice (1951) 9). Thus, an interpretation that would 
leave certain aspects of the treaty meaningless does not seem likely. 
162 Klabbers has argued that a treaty’s object and purpose is a difficult test to apply, and one that is so flexible 
that it may be used to support completely opposing views. See Klabbers (1997) 139, 159-160. 
The critique on relying on the object and purpose of a treaty is apt, yet some parts of it could be directed to any 
given method of interpretation – even interpretations solely relying on the texts may be diametrically opposed. I 
have attempted to tackle this issue with the balanced formulation above regarding the object and purpose of the 
ECT that acknowledges both the commercial and environmental aspects of the ECT. The formulation does not 
aim to upend the established practice under the ECT, but rather to nudge such practice towards a more equitable 
situation, where the various aspects of the Treaty are given more equal significance.  
163 Eiser Infrastucture Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.À.R.I. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36, Award (4 May 2017) [99-100] 
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in other words, I have assigned the ordinary meaning to the terms used in the text in good 
faith, as is stipulated in the VCLT.164  
3.3.2. Article 18: Sovereignty over Energy Resources 
Article 18 of the ECT is comprised of four paragraphs concerning different aspects of 
sovereignty over energy resources.165 Paragraphs 18(1) and 18(3) have significance for the 
environment166 whereas paragraphs 18(2) and 18(4) are more concerned with the fairness of 
the trade and investment regime. 
Paragraph 18(1) states that: 
“The Contracting Parties recognize state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy 
resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to 
the rules of international law.” 
The first sentence of the paragraph sets the standard of sovereignty over resources167, 
however, everything that follows within Article 18 sets limitations to the states’ sovereign 
powers. The second sentence of the paragraph is of significance for the environment, as it 
ascertains that the sovereign rights are still subject to the rules of international law. Thus, 
states cannot utilise, or allow the utilisation, of the resources in an unlawful way. There are 
no lex specialis rules that would, e.g. prohibit certain types of energy installations. However, 
there are certain lex generalis rules through Customary International Law that the states must 
adhere to, although due to their customary nature it might be difficult to show that they would 
have been breached. Perhaps the most important such general rule in this instance was 
confirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion concerning Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons in which the Court found that states have an obligation to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states.168 In the 
ECT context this means that states may not allow the use of their territory for activities 
 
164 VCLT Art 31(1). 
165 Although the term “sovereignty” is used, there are in fact several limitations to the states’ powers. The Treaty 
acknowledges in Article 18(2) that “[T]he Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Contracting Parties 
governing the system of property ownership of energy resources”, which could allow for states to disregard their 
ECT obligations. This possibility, however, was foreseen, and the representatives made a Declaration, according 
to which “Article 18(2) shall not be construed to allow the circumvention of the application of the other 
provision of the Treaty.”  
Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Declaration V 
166 Shine (1996) 522 
167 The formulation of Article 18(1) relies on the formulation used in the GA resolution 1803 (XVII) titled 
‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, adopted 14 December 1962. 
168 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (Advisory Opinion) (8 July 1996) [29] 
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harmful to other states. However, it is unclear what the practical consequences of this rule 
might be as, for example, the use of coal is still lawful, despite the fact that burning coal 
certainly damages the environment of other states. Furthermore, the paragraph allows for 
states to voluntarily accept restrictions on their sovereignty by ratifying instruments aiming at 
the protection of the environment.169 
Paragraph 18(3), with added emphasis, states that: 
“Each state continues to hold in particular the rights to decide the geographical areas 
within its Area to be made available for exploration and development of its energy 
resources, the optimisation of their recovery and the rate at which they may be depleted 
or otherwise exploited, to specify and enjoy any taxes, royalties or other financial 
payments payable by virtue of such exploration and exploitation, and to regulate the 
environmental and safety aspects of such exploration, development and reclamation 
within its Area, and to participate in such exploration and exploitation, inter alia, through 
direct participation by the government or through state enterprises” 
This paragraph is of particular importance, as it explicitly establishes that states continue to 
hold the right to regulate large parts of the energy cycle, although it falls short of explicitly 
allowing for regulating the exploitation of resources for environmental reasons. Despite this, 
states nevertheless continue to hold the right to decide the rate of exploitation, and where170 
such activities may be conducted. In essence, this means that states may unilaterally adopt 
stricter measures to protect the environment and natural resources, as long as such measures 
do not conflict with other treaty obligations of the state, such as most favoured nation -, or 
FET-standards.171 Paragraph 18(4) further confirms that states shall act in a non-
discriminatory manner when facilitation access to energy resources. As paragraph 18(3) is the 
only section in the ECT where the right to regulate is explicitly stated, it is curious that this 
Article has never been referred to in a public arbitrational award.172  
 
169 Shine (1996) 523 
170 The paragraph leaves some ambiguity in this matter, as according to it states have the right decide where 
exploration and development of its resources can be conducted. It does not differentiate between exploration and 
development, which could lead to the conclusion that if exploration is allowed, then development is as well. 
This aspect could be of importance in the ongoing Rockhopper v. Italy arbitration, where Rockhopper has 
explored Italy’s coast for oil, and Italy has since passed stricter environmental regulation setting limits on how 
close to the shore such oil installation can be placed. See: Rockhopper Italia S.p.A., Rockhopper Mediterranean 
Ltd, and Rockhopper Exploration Plc v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14 
171 Shine (1996) 524 
172 As of 27 July 2020, see ECT Secretariat’s database on cases under the ECT, available at 
<https://www.energychartertreaty.org/cases/list-of-cases/> 
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At the core of Article 18 is that the states have the sovereign right to exploit their resources, 
and regulate any activities relating to energy, as long as the regulation complies with the ECT 
and apply to foreign and domestic actors equally. 
3.3.3. Article 19: Environmental Aspects 
Article 19 is the only article in the Energy Charter Treaty that exclusively concerns 
environmental matters, and although the article is quite lengthy, it is still notably small in 
might when compared to the weight given to environmental matters in the Preamble of the 
Treaty. The Article is comprised of 3 paragraphs, of which 19(1) and 19(3) are discussed 
under this heading, whereas Article 19(2) is discussed under Chapter 4, as it concerns dispute 
settlement between states. Further, Article 19(1) is best discussed divided unto separate 
paragraphs, as otherwise the result would be impractical. As Article 19(3) defines several key 
concepts of the Article 19, it is beneficial to explore certain of these definitions first, before 
looking into the material provisions of the Article. 
Article 19(3) defines certain key terms of the Article, namely those of “Energy Cycle”, 
“Environmental Impact”, “Improving Energy Efficiency” and “Cost-Effective”. The 
definitions of the Energy Cycle and Environmental Impact are particularly broad. Energy 
Cycle means the entirety of the chain, covering exploration, production and use of energy, 
and also the decommissioning of such activities.173 Environmental Impact is equally broad, 
covering any effect caused by a given activity on the environment, including health, flora, 
fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape, monuments, cultural heritage and socio-economic 
conditions resulting from these factors.174 Thus, the scope of Article 19 is very wide – any 
activity related to energy, which has an impact on the environment falls within it.  
The first part of Article 19(1) lays out the primary environmental obligations of the member 
states: 
“In pursuit of sustainable development and taking into account its obligations under those 
international agreements concerning the environment to which it is party, each 
Contracting Party shall strive to minimise in an economically efficient manner harmful 
Environmental Impacts occurring either within or outside its Area from all operations 
within the Energy Cycle in its Area, taking proper account of safety. In doing so each 
Contracting Party shall act in a Cost-Effective manner. In its policies and actions each 
 
173 ECT Article 19(3)(a) 
174 ECT Article 19(3)(b) 
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Contracting Party shall strive to take precautionary measures to prevent or minimise 
environmental degradation. The Contracting Parties agree that the polluter in the Areas of 
Contracting Parties, should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, including 
transboundary pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
Investment in the Energy Cycle or international trade.” 
The above contains plenty of important aspects, but it must be noted that the obligations are 
weak – each obligation regarding the environment is formulated so that the states shall strive 
to act in a certain way. The use of the word strive implies that these are obligations of 
conduct, rather than obligations of result, i.e. they do not obligate a state to reach a certain 
outcome, but rather to attempt reaching it.175 Furthermore, these obligations contain extra 
qualifiers, namely that states shall act in a cost-effective manner when striving for the 
environmental goods, and must not distort international investment and trade in the energy 
field in the process. Essentially, the formulation of environmental obligations makes it 
difficult to show that a state would have breached its environmental obligations, which limits 
their usefulness in inter-state disputes, or when relied upon an investor against the host state, 
leading Shine to argue that it would be unlikely that Article 19 would have much significance 
in disputes.176 So far, this has been the situation, with references to Article 19 in arbitration 
awards rare.177 However, I argue that the situation is changing and that these obligations, or 
rights, could become increasingly useful to states responding against investor claims, as is 
discussed under Chapter 4. Below, I disseminate the environmental obligations of ECT 
parties as laid out in Article 19(1). This is done in great detail, as Article 19 contains most of 
the environmental aspects of the ECT and is thus of great importance for this paper. 
Firstly, the paragraph invokes sustainable development, a concept which has already had 
considerable effect in treaty interpretation178 or even in sidestepping certain treaty 
obligations.179 The paragraph does not explicitly say that parties should either act or strive to 
act sustainably. However, the formulation of the paragraph – ‘pursuit’ – and the nature of the 
concept of sustainable development implies that this is an obligation of conduct, essentially 
stipulating that states cannot ignore environmental aspects. This obligation is further clarified 
 
175 Constantin P. Economides, ‘Content of the Obligation: Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result’ in 
Crawford et al (eds) The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2010) 371-381 
176 Shine (1996) 537 
177 Article 19 of the ECT has only been referred in public awards at the recent Spanish solar energy cases, which 
will be discussed under Chapter 5. 
178 E.g. The US-Shrimps case discussed above. 
179 ICJ, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) (25 September 1997) [140] 
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with another obligation of conduct, namely that states shall strive to minimise harmful 
environmental impacts within the energy cycle. It is noteworthy that the obligation to pursue 
sustainable development is a continuing one – it applies to new projects as well to those that 
are already ongoing.180 
These obligations do not bind a state to a specific result, e.g. shutting down coal power 
plants, nor can a state be easily found to be in breach of them. On the other hand, such weak 
obligations can be read as rights that would offer a state normative support should they wish 
to regulate environmental matters more strictly.181 The first section of the paragraph again 
refers to other international environmental agreements; however, such agreements rarely 
contain explicit obligations of result that could offer an unambiguous solution to disputes 
under the ECT – rather they may offer more context for interpretation of the ECT itself. 
Secondly, the paragraph invokes the precautionary approach, stipulating that the policies and 
actions of states should be aiming to minimise or prevent environmental degradation. Again, 
it is difficult to prove a breach of such an obligation as states are only obliged to strive 
towards acting precautionary, but it offers further justification to a state wishing to take more 
aggressive climate actions. 
Lastly, the paragraph invokes the polluter pays -principle, which means that the person 
responsible for the pollution ought to bear the costs of pollution.182 The aim of the principle is 
to internalise the costs of producing energy in an unsustainable way, rather than passing the 
costs to the taxpayers or leaving them unpaid, resulting in the degradation of the 
environment.183 Were the principle fully implemented, it would reflect the true environmental 
costs of producing energy184 and thus drive the production costs of the most unsustainable 
forms of energy higher. The paragraph, however, contains several caveats that weaken the 
rule. According to the Treaty, the polluter pays -principle, applies in principle, with regard to 
public interest and without distorting investments or trade. Even though the obligation is 
 
180 Ibid  
181 Although the formulation of Article 19 means that the provisions in question are certainly obligations of a 
state; a state may, however, utilise them as rights to regulate more strictly, and thus respond to Article 10 claims 
by relying on them. 
182 Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie, Principles of International 
Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 228-229 
183 Shine (1996) 527 
184 Which is among the objectives of the Charter, Title 1.3. Charter Title 1.3., polluter pays -principle, and the 
cost-effectiveness (discussed below under Section 4.2.2.) considered together could lead to interesting 
arguments, as states would be able to argue that the ECT framework offers clear support for measures that are 
adverse for the profits of producers of fossil fuel based energy.  
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worded quite weakly, the principle is applied in many of the state parties, in particular within 
the EU.185 
Thus, the primary environmental obligations of states are to strive towards sustainable 
development, to strive to take precautionary measures and, in principle, to internalise the 
costs of energy production. Paragraph 19(1) also lists an eleven-point list of measures that 
states are required to comply with. However, each of the action points is formulated similarly 
to the primary obligations - permissively. These action points will be discussed below, 
individually: 
“Contracting Parties shall accordingly: 
(a) Take account of environmental considerations throughout the formulation and 
implementation of their energy policies;” 
The subparagraph obligates states to “take account” of environmental considerations, but it 
does not clarify what this would entail.186 The obligation relates more to conduct than to 
actually achieving a particular result, yet it does obligate states to formulate their energy 
policies, and from those formulations the state’s environmental considerations should be 
deductible – thus a state could potentially be in breach of this obligation, if no such 
consideration of environmental matters is to be found in their policies. 
(b) “promote market-oriented price formation and a fuller reflection of environmental 
costs and benefits throughout the Energy Cycle;” 
This is another weakly worded obligation, as states are only obligated to promote the 
reflection of true costs and market-oriented price formation. Although it would seem that all 
states would have the interest to do this – in theory, the true reflection of environmental costs 
would steeply increase the opportunity costs187 of utilising unsustainable forms of energy, 
and thus direct rational actors towards sustainable forms of energy. Fossil fuel-based energy, 
however, is often cheaper than sustainable forms of energy, at least initially. Thus, many 
 
185 The EU utilises an emission trading system, in which e.g. companies producing energy must buy emission 
rights, in order to be able to pollute. See <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en> accessed on 18 March 
2020. 
186 Shine lists several issues that should be covered while taking account of the matter. Shine (1996) 528 
187 Opportunity cost is a term used in economics and refers to what the situation would be if assets had been 
used differently e.g. in sustainable energy instead of dirty energy. The matter is discussed further below. 
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states may be concerned about their own competitiveness188 if they would allow for the price 
of energy to reflect the true environmental costs.189 
(c) “having regard to Article 34(4), encourage cooperation in the attainment of the 
environmental objectives of the Charter and cooperation in the field of international 
environmental standards for the Energy Cycle, taking into account differences in 
adverse effects and abatement costs between Contracting Parties;” 
Article 34 concerns the Energy Charter Conference, the co-operative body established by the 
ECT to be its deciding body. This subparagraph again only encourages cooperation, thus 
even falling short of actually obligating states to cooperate to some degree. Therefore, it is a 
very weak obligation, although, if there were a wide cooperation in the field of energy policy 
it would eliminate some of the fears of losing the competitive edge, and thus would allow for 
the true environmental costs to be better reflected. The advanced level of harmonisation 
achieved in the EU is a good example of this, as the EU as a bloc has managed to cut down 
on emissions.190 The subparagraph also takes into account that not all states are similarly 
affected, or similarly able to abate the costs of environmental protection. 
(d) “have particular regard to Improving Energy Efficiency, to developing and using 
renewable energy sources, to promoting the use of cleaner fuels and to employing 
technologies and technological means that reduce pollution;” 
This subparagraph, although containing a generally laudable goal without any particular 
obligations191, nevertheless explicitly states the preference of the parties – renewable energy 
over dirty energy. Although it does not obligate the parties to achieve a certain result, this 
stated preference can be of significance in a dispute. The PEEREA concerns matters similar 
to this subparagraph in greater detail. 
(e) “promote the collection and sharing among Contracting Parties of information on 
environmentally sound and economically efficient energy policies and Cost-Effective 
practices and technologies;” 
 
188 This issue would provide for an interesting subject to be examined through the methodology of game theory, 
a theme which is also briefly discussed below. 
189 Shine (1996) 530 
190 See <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1180.pdf> accessed on 18 March 2020 
191 Shine (1996) 532 
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The subparagraph simply encourages states to share information on their practises, yet it does 
not obligate to it. Again, it offers evidence of the signatories’ preference towards 
sustainability, but this subparagraph is unlikely to have much effect in settlement of disputes. 
(f) “promote public awareness of the Environmental Impacts of energy systems, of the 
scope for the prevention or abatement of their adverse Environmental Impacts, and of 
the costs associated with various prevention or abatement measures;” 
The promotion of public awareness serves several purposes; consumers better informed of the 
environmental impacts of energy production would arguably be more likely to prefer 
renewable energy sources. Furthermore, informed consumers strengthen the functioning of 
the energy market, as more consumers would act akin to the fictional economic man.192 This 
subparagraph, however, suffers from the same shortcomings as the others: It merely obligates 
states to promote certain type of conduct – an easily fulfilled obligation. 
(g) “promote and cooperate in the research, development and application of energy 
efficient and environmentally sound technologies, practices and processes which will 
minimise harmful Environmental Impacts of all aspects of the Energy Cycle in an 
economically efficient manner;” 
Again, an easily fulfilled obligation, as it is advantageous for every state to promote the 
research and development of environmentally sound solutions. The subparagraph, however, 
is ever so slightly stronger than most under Article 19: In addition to obligating states to 
promote certain type of conduct, it actually obligates them to cooperate to some degree. As 
the threshold of cooperation is not defined, it is unlikely that this subparagraph would have 
much effect on disputes. 
(h) “encourage favourable conditions for the transfer and dissemination of such 
technologies consistent with the adequate and effective protection of Intellectual 
Property rights;” 
As the dissemination of environmentally sound technologies, discussed under subparagraph 
(g), is of great importance especially for cutting the emissions of developing countries, the 
formulation of this subparagraph is disappointing and, as argued by Shine, provides an 
example of how the Treaty places investment and trade at the forefront instead of the 
 
192 A term similar to the “reasonable person” used in law to mean a fictional person to which behaviour would 
be compared to. 
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environment193, because the text of the subparagraph falls short of the language of Article 4.5 
of the Climate Change Convention194, according to which developed countries are to “take all 
appropriate steps to … transfer environmentally sound technology…”. Instead, ECT obligates 
for states to merely encourage favourable conditions. The disappointing implications of the 
formulation put aside; this subparagraph is unlikely to have much significance in a dispute. 
(i) “promote the transparent assessment at an early stage and prior to decision, and 
subsequent monitoring, of Environmental Impacts of environmentally significant 
energy investment projects;” 
The content of this paragraph is relatively clear – states are to promote the usage of 
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) for projects which are environmentally 
significant. The significance of this paragraph has been discussed in an arbitration 
proceeding, in which the tribunal found that it does not create a self-standing obligation for 
the investor to conduct such an assessment and stated that such obligation must be based on 
the national law of the host state.195 
(j) “promote international awareness and information exchange on Contracting Parties’ 
relevant environmental programmes and standards and on the implementation of those 
programmes and standards;” 
Again, this subparagraph encourages states to communicate openly, and would have little 
significance in disputes. In practice, the energy policies of different states are fairly openly 
communicated currently.196 
(k) “participate, upon request, and within their available resources, in the development 
and implementation of appropriate environmental programmes in the Contracting 
Parties.” 
States are obligated to assist each other in developing and implementing appropriate 
environmental programmes. The subparagraph is quite ambiguous, but it makes a reference to 
the available resources, thus allowing for states themselves to decide what would be the 
appropriate level of participation should such participation be requested. 
 
193 Shine (1996) 533 
194 To which an explicit reference is made in the Preamble. 
195 Blusun S.A., Jean Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Award 
(27 December 2016) [275] 
196 E.g. The International Energy Agency frequently publishes analysis on the energy policies of its member 
countries, see <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/> accessed on 27 May 2020. 
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Above I have discussed Article 19(1) of the Treaty. All of the obligations laid out in the 
paragraphs are of a very soft nature, which means that it would be extremely difficult to show 
that a state would be in breach of any of these obligations. The paragraph is clearly written 
from the perspective of a state that wishes to cover its bases and avoid claims that it would 
have breached its environmental obligations, as it does not obligate the states to any 
particular result. This does not mean that the environmental clauses of Article 19 would be 
without significance, however.197 It is unlikely that a case by either an investor or a state 
could mainly rely on Article 19(1), but the obligations laid therein may nevertheless be 
referred to as a support of legitimate expectations of the investor, or the legitimate interests of 
a state.  
3.3.4. Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects  
The Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects was negotiated, 
opened for signature and entered into force on 16 April 1998, simultaneously with the Treaty 
itself.198 The Energy Charter Treaty framework has underlined the importance of energy 
efficiency and environmental protection since the Charter, and the PEEREA builds on this 
subject. The PEEREA is legally binding part of the ECT framework for those countries that 
have ratified it.199 Thus far, the PEEREA is the only protocol to the Treaty. 
The PEEREA contains mostly similar soft obligations – formulated as shall strive – as Article 
19 of the Treaty does, and its main function seems to be establishing a forum for contracting 
parties to cooperate on matters related to energy efficiency.200 Nevertheless, the PEEREA 
also lays out some more specific obligations and acts as further evidence of the intent of the 
negotiators to consider environmental matters as well, through its explicit promotion of 
sustainable development and the full-cost principle.201  
In addition to its soft obligation provisions, the PEEREA includes three obligations of result 
in Articles 3(2), 5, and 8(1), which, respectively, state that: 
“Contracting Parties shall establish energy efficiency policies and appropriate legal and 
regulatory frameworks which promote, inter alia: (a) efficient functioning of market 
 
197 See supra note 10. 
198 Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty: A Reader’s Guide (Energy Charter Secretariat 2002) 
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Belarus applies it provisionally. See https://www.energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-
efficiency-protocol/ accessed 19 March 2020 
200 Energy Charter Secretariat (2002) 44 
201 PEEREA, Art 1(2) 
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mechanisms including market-oriented price formation and a fuller reflection of 
environmental costs and benefits; (b) reduction of barriers to energy efficiency, thus 
stimulating investments; (c) mechanisms for financing energy efficiency initiatives; (d) 
education and awareness; (e) dissemination and transfer of technologies; (f) transparency 
of legal and regulatory frameworks. 202”; 
“Contracting Parties shall formulate strategies and policy aims for Improving Energy 
Efficiency and thereby reducing Environmental Impacts of the Energy Cycle as 
appropriate in relation to their own specific energy conditions. These strategies and policy 
aims shall be transparent to all interested parties.203”; and 
“In order to achieve the policy aims formulated according to Article 5, each Contracting 
Party shall develop, implement and regularly update energy efficiency programmes best 
suited to its circumstances.204” 
As is evident from above, the Contracting Parties to PEEREA are obligated to establish and 
formulate policies and strategies for the improvement of energy efficiency in order to reduce 
the negative environmental impacts of energy. The PEEREA does not state what these 
policies and strategies ought to include, besides stating in paragraph 3(4) that “Energy 
efficiency policies shall include both short-term measures for the adjustment of previous 
practices and long-term measures to improve energy efficiency throughout the Energy 
Cycle”. With such loosely worded obligations, it would in practice not be difficult for a state 
to fulfil these by having some policies in place,205 however, the more thorough such policies 
and strategies are, the better a state’s position is to defend their actions to protect the 
environment, as it could argue that an investor should have been aware of such policies. 
Despite the somewhat soft wording of these sections, the Contracting Parties of the PEEREA 
are nevertheless obligated to have policies and strategies for improving energy efficiency, 
which in practice would mean that there must be some plan to reduce dependency on energy 
sources based on fossil fuels.  
It is noteworthy, that the PEEREA, despite its title, preamble and stated objectives, devotes 
relatively few lines for discussion of environmental reasons to improve energy efficiency. 
 
202 PEEREA, Art 3(2) 
203 PEEREA, Art 5 
204 PEEREA, Art 8(1) 
205 Shine (1996) 540 
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Instead, the PEEREA focuses on the trade and economic benefits of energy efficiency.206 
However, as the Protocol so clearly invokes sustainable development as its objective, this 
apparent focus on economic benefits should not be interpreted in a way that would place 
secondary importance to environmental matters. Instead, with the nature of the PEEREA kept 
in mind207, it should be understood as a way to incentivise energy efficiency through arguing 
that it is also beneficial to the state itself, and not just to the global community. 
The significance the PEEREA might receive in disputes is limited, as it does not contain 
many binding obligations. However, depending on the quality of fulfilment of these 
obligations, the position of an investor as the claimant, or state as the respondent may be 
stronger.208 Furthermore, the PEEREA further emphasises the intent of the negotiators to 
emphasise the significance of environmental matters, which ought to be considered when 
applying the ECT in a dispute.  
Under the following heading, I have discussed one of the few ECT cases, which explicitly 
concerns Article 19 obligations, and their significance. 
3.4. Analysis of Blusun v. Italy arbitration 
Blusun S.A., Jean Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic (“Blusun v. 
Italy”)209 concerned a dispute stemming from the Italian reform in the solar energy sector. 
The investors argued that the reform breached their rights under the ECT, namely the FET 
standard under Article 10(1) and that the measures had an effect equivalent to expropriation 
under Article 13(1).210 Although there have been several relatively similar solar cases under 
the ECT, Blusun v. Italy is worth investigating here, as it is a rarity among the ECT by 
explicitly discussing the significance of Article 19 obligations. 
Article 19(1)(i), as discussed above, obligates states to promote the utilisation of EIAs. The 
investors, however, had not conducted an EIA for their solar based power plant, and thus, the 
respondent argued the ECT would not afford protection to their investment.211 The claimants 
 
206 Ibid 
207 By this, I mean the focus of the PEEREA to facilitate cooperation in the field of energy efficiency rather than 
setting strict rules. 
208 E.g. if a state has clearly complied with the softly worded obligations of the PEEREA, it might argue that as 
evidence of good faith; or if a state has very vague policies for achieving energy efficiency, an investor could 
more plausibly claim that their legitimate expectations have been breached. 
209 Blusun S.A., Jean Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3 
210 Xiaoxia Lin, ‘Investors’ legitimate expectations claims against Italy dismissed due to the absence of specific 
commitments’ (IISD 27 June 2019), accessed at www.iisd.org on 28 May 2020. 
211 Blusun v. Italy [274] 
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argued that the tribunal would not have jurisdiction over alleged breaches of Article 19, 
because it does not fall under Part III of the ECT.212 The tribunal found that 
“it is at least arguable that a tribunal constituted under Part III of the ECT could take 
into account conduct clearly in breach of other provisions of the ECT insofar as it is 
relevant to the admissibility of a claim.”213 
The tribunal seems to confirm that Article 19 may have significance in disputes falling under 
Part III of the ECT. The tribunal, however, continues that 
“The key point, however, is that Article 19 operates not at the level of individual 
investors but at the interstate level, as is equally the case with the developing general 
international law of EIAs.”214 
At first, the above segment seems detrimental to the argument that Article 19 would be useful 
for states in ISDS proceedings. It seems to suggest that the Article would bear no relevance in 
the relations between the investor and the host state. Such interpretation is only partly correct 
and, contrary to the possible first impression, the tribunal’s interpretation does not run against 
the argument presented in this thesis. As has been discussed above, nothing in Article 19 
creates a direct obligation to the investors. This lack of direct obligations to investors is clear 
from the last sentence of Article 19(1) “Contracting Parties shall”, which confirms the 
tribunal’s analysis that these are obligations for the state, not the investor. Article 19 therefore 
cannot be used in such a way as the respondent tried in Blusun v. Italy. However, were the 
state measures for the protection of the environment, rather than cutting costs, nothing in the 
Blusun v. Italy award, or the Treaty, would prevent a state from arguing that Article 19 
supports its measures – argument which is returned to in Chapter 4.  
The tribunal rejected Italy’s claim that the investment would not be protected under the ECT, 
as there was no law in place in Italy that would have required the investors to conduct an EIA 
for their project.215 Nevertheless, the tribunal ultimately ruled for Italy as it did not find either 
a breach of FET standard or expropriation. To summarise, the Blusun v. Italy showed that a 
state could not proactively invoke the Article 19 obligations,216 as it applies on an interstate 
level. However, states may use Article 19 reactively to defend their own position. 
 
212 Ibid [155, 275] 
213 Ibid.  
214 Ibid.  
215 Ibid [276] 
216 I.e. by forcing the claimant to defend their position on Article 19 matters. 
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3.5. The International Energy Charter 
The International Energy Charter is a political declaration signed in 2015.217 Although it does 
not contain any legally binding obligations, the International Energy Charter may still have 
some interpretative value regarding the intentions of the ECT parties, as it is clearly related to 
the Treaty itself and is accepted by the signatories as such.218 The VCLT states that such 
related instruments add to the context of the treaty to be interpreted.219  
Mainly, the International Energy Charter simply restates the political declarations contained 
within the European Energy Charter, which is not without significance in itself, as it also 
reaffirms the will of the parties to protect the environment, at times emphasising the 
relevance of environmental protection even further220 in order to adapt to new challenges.221 
It is nevertheless unlikely that the International Energy Charter would gain much significance 
in an interpretation of the ECT, as the instrument explicitly states that it is merely a 
declaration of political intention222, and as the ECT does not contain a direct referral to the 
instrument.223  
3.6. Summary 
In this chapter, I have discussed the environmental aspects of the Energy Charter Treaty 
framework. It seems clear that there are indeed very few strictly binding environmental 
obligations for the parties. However, the sheer volume of references to matters such as 
sustainable development and the protection of the environment, and remembering the fact 
that treaties are to be interpreted as a whole,224 leads to the conclusion that environmental 
aspects ought to be considered more often when interpreting or applying the ECT.  
The ECT contains several best practice recommendations for states for the protection of the 
environment, and the fact that most of the environmental obligations are of rather soft law 
 
217 See <https://www.energycharter.org/process/international-energy-charter-2015/overview/> accessed 24 
March 2020. 
218 The International Energy Charter is published as a related document to the ECT by the Secretariat, see The 
International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty with Related Documents (2016) 
219 VCLT Art 31(2)(b) 
220 In Title I: Objectives of the International Energy Charter, the very first sentence concerns the pursuit of 
sustainable development. 
221 Urban Rusnák, ‘Foreword’ in The International Energy Charter Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty with 
Related Documents (Energy Charter Secretariat 15 January 2016) 
222 International Energy Charter, Preamble 
223 Unlike how the ECT refers directly to the Charter. 
224 E.g. McNair (1961) 381 
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nature is not as limiting in practice as has been argued in the past.225 When the ECT was 
negotiated and ratified, it must have seemed likely that states would not wish to take on these 
best practices due to their higher costs. However, the knowledge concerning the environment 
has been greatly clarified since, and it is becoming an increasingly plausible scenario that a 
state would wish to regulate the use of dirty energy in a way that is more costly in the short 
term, but beneficial to the environment.226 As discussed, the ECT sets out many 
recommendations and general obligations of minimising environmental harm. Therefore, it 
seems increasingly likely that a state that has passed stricter environmental regulations could 
successfully defend such actions in investor-state dispute settlement proceedings relying on 
the environmental aspects of the Treaty. However, there is no such public case known. 
Above I have identified the environmental obligations and recommendations contained 
within the ECT. In the next Chapter, I discuss how these findings might have practical effect 
on dispute settlement or in state practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 E.g. Shine (1996) 537 
226 E.g. Vattenfall v. Germany (I), which was settled before arbitration 
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4. Applying the Novel Interpretation of the ECT 
4.1. Introduction 
Having discussed the environmental aspects of the Energy Charter Treaty framework, I now 
add some practical considerations to what has already been discussed. Firstly, I briefly 
discuss how states might apply, or have applied, the environmental recommendations of the 
ECT. In this instance, I also discuss economic aspects of the matter, as many of the 
environmental obligations include the caveat of having to be cost-effective, as seen above. 
Secondly, as the ECT is a highly litigated instrument, I identify certain ways in which the 
environmental aspects of the ECT may be of significance in investor-state and inter-state 
disputes under the ECT and how a state or an investor might argue cases which have 
environmental significance. Further, I apply the findings to an actual ECT dispute, where 
they could have resulted in a different outcome. To do this, the scope of discussion is 
broadened to also cover the investment protection aspects of the ECT, which were 
summarised under Chapter 2. 
4.2. In State Conduct 
4.2.1. Measures to Protect the Environment  
The contracting parties to the ECT are bound by several softly worded environmental 
obligations227, including those discussed above. Although states are not obligated to take any 
particular action to protect the environment in the field of energy, they nevertheless have the 
interest to do so. It is becoming increasingly clear that reliance on fossil fuels is wholly 
unsustainable, and thus every state would have a clear interest in reducing this reliance. 
As was established above, the Energy Charter Treaty, although softly worded on 
environmental obligations, nevertheless urges states to take action to protect the environment 
and minimise damage to it. Applying this novel interpretation of the ECT in state practice 
would quite simply put, mean that states should actively aim to quit producing energy 
through fossil fuels, and increase the production of renewable energy in order to meet their 
energy efficiency obligations. There is no point in trying to list every measure a state could 
take to reach such goals. Yet, some examples of such environmental measures, which have 
had repercussions under the ECT regime, are passing stricter regulations for coal-based 
 
227 All ECT parties are also parties to a number of exclusively environmental agreements. These agreements 
rarely contain obligations for specific acts but cutting emissions would bring a state towards compliance with 
their obligations under such agreements. 
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power plants,228 banning coastal oil drilling,229 or incentivising the production of renewable 
energy with price guarantees.230  
The Energy Charter Treaty contains several hurdles to such a straightforward approach. 
Firstly, any measures taken in order to minimise environmental damages or to achieve further 
energy efficiency must be economically efficient and cost-effective.231 Secondly, and more 
importantly, the ECT’s purpose is also to protect investments, and it is among the most 
litigated investment treaties in existence. Thus, if a state wishes to take regulative action to 
minimise environmental harm, it must also be prepared to defend its actions before an 
arbitration tribunal under the auspices of the ECT. Below, I have discussed these hurdles 
under their respective headings.  
4.2.2. The Requirement of Cost Effectiveness 
Whenever the ECT concerns environmental matters, it also states that measures taken to 
minimise damage to the environment must be cost-effective. Further, Article 10 forbids 
unreasonable measures towards foreign investors. Although unreasonableness is not defined 
in the ECT context, it is arguable that if a state can prove their measures to be cost-effective, 
such measures could not be wholly unreasonable. Cost-effectiveness is defined in Article 
19(3)(d) as achieving a defined objective at the lowest cost or achieving the greatest benefit 
at a given cost. This definition allows for parties to choose whether the priority is given to 
environmental objectives or cost parameters.232 Under this section, I argue that the 
requirement for cost-effectiveness is relatively easy to fulfil when transitioning from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy. 
Admittedly, at the time of negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty, the result of the cost-
effectiveness requirement might have been an added layer of protection for fossil fuels, as the 
cost of production of energy through renewable sources was high when compared to the 
production of energy through fossil fuels.233 The cost of producing renewable energy has 
plummeted since the negotiating of the ECT, and the production costs are now at a 
 
228 E.g. Vattenfall v. Germany (I) 
229 E.g. Rockhopper v. Italy 
230 E.g. The various solar cases in Spain, Italy or the Czech Republic. 
231 ECT Article 19(1) 
232 Shine (1996) 526 
233 Which is understandable as the technologies required for renewable energy are newer than those required for 
non-renewable energy sources. 
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comparable, or lower, level to those of fossil fuels.234 However, the initial setting-up costs 
may still be higher for renewable energy projects. Thus, it seems that even the simplest 
method of assessing the cost-effectiveness of producing energy, namely the cost per unit of 
energy, seems to support the shift to renewable sources of energy.  
The use of such a simple method, however, does not find support in the text of the ECT. 
Instead, the ECT framework consistently states that the cost of energy235 should more fully 
reflect the true environmental costs and benefits.236 This formulation extends the concept of 
cost to include also considerations of transaction costs and opportunity costs. Transaction 
and opportunity costs are key concepts in law and economics -approach, and they, 
respectively, mean that in a given transaction all the costs are considered, and that the actors 
must also consider the alternative situation that would exist were the resources used 
differently. It is impossible to assess accurately the potential costs that climate change, to 
which fossil fuels contribute considerably, might cause.237 It is clear, however, that if 
measures are not taken to combat climate change, the costs will be extreme. A single energy 
project will neither ascertain nor prevent catastrophic climate change, nor can a percentage of 
these costs be assigned to a single project. Despite such innate uncertainties in assigning the 
true environmental costs to a project, it is clear that when transaction and opportunity costs 
are considered, practically any transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources is 
cost-effective. 
As discussed, the cost-effectiveness of measures to protect the environment is not the only 
aspect to be considered – the Energy Charter Treaty is significantly focused in the protection 
of investments, and the novel interpretation of the Treaty has been applied to the investment 
protection aspects of the Treaty below. 
 
234 Dominic Dudley, ‘Renewable Energy Costs Take Another Tumble, Making Fossil Fuels Look More 
Expensive Than Ever’ (Forbes, 29 May 2019), accessed at www.forbes.com on 27 May 2020. 
235 Although measures to protect the environment, and the production of renewable energy are not exactly 
interchangeable as concepts go, but in the context of the ECT they ought to be understood as such: Essentially 
any measure to protect the environment that is relevant under the ECT framework would aim at increasing the 
share of renewable energy at the expense of fossil fuels. Therefore, the cost-effectiveness of measures to protect 
the environment must be assessed through comparing the costs of protective measures, in other words renewable 
energy sources, to the costs of non-renewable sources of energy. 
236 Charter Titles 1.3, 2.7; ECT Article 19(1)(b); PEEREA Preamble, Article 1(2), Article 3(2) 
237 However, this uncertainty is not damning to the argument, as the ECT acknowledges the precautionary 
approach in Article 19(1), meaning that scientific uncertainty cannot be a reason to withhold action. 
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4.3. Litigation Techniques focused on the Environmental Aspects of the ECT 
4.3.1. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
4.3.1.1. Introduction 
States might apply the novel interpretation of the ECT in numerous ways. The practice has 
shown, however, that state measures in the field of energy are often contested by the 
investors and litigated in arbitration proceedings. In this section I build on what has been 
discussed above and formulate litigation techniques that utilise the interpretation focusing on 
the environmental aspects of the treaty. Naturally, such techniques must be grounded on the 
Treaty itself, and thus I have not aimed to formulate techniques that would render parts of the 
Treaty meaningless. 
Whitsitt and Bankes have identified four main types of disputes that arise in the energy 
sector, these being 1) disputes involving significant economic or political structural 
adjustment in the host state; 2) disputes triggered by the efforts of host states seeking to claim 
an enhanced share of resource rents; 3) disputes in which the host state seeks to enhance their 
environmental or social regulatory regimes; and 4) disputes in which host states seek to 
withdraw economic incentives for policy measures that were introduced to support particular 
policies.238 I have focused on the third category cases – those involving states seeking to 
enhance their environmental protection regimes. Cases belonging to the fourth category of 
disputes are also of some significance in this discussion, as the numerous solar power cases 
under the ECT fall under said category. 
Firstly, I discuss ISDS-proceedings, particularly focusing on Articles 10 and 13 and their 
relation to environmental measures and each other, and the applicability of Article 24 and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade239 (“GATT”) exceptions for environmental reasons. 
The focus is on techniques suitable for states as a respondent, which would be used in the 
merit phase of cases, although it is possible that an investor would rely on the environmental 
aspects of the treaty240, or that environmental aspects would have significance during the 
jurisdiction phase241 of a case. It is noteworthy that Articles 10 and 13 protect the investors 
 
238 Elizabeth Whitsitt and Nigel Bankes, 'The Evolution of International Investment Law and Its Application to 
the Energy Sector' (2013) 51 Alta L Rev 207, 211 
239 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
240 E.g. Spanish Solar Cases 
241 E.g. Yukos Cases – the question was not of environmental aspects, but of the applicability of the ‘clean 
hands’ principle. The significance of the maxim remains unclear, but the argument could be made that if the 
investor has breached (environmental) laws of the host state, they would lose the right for investment arbitration 
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only from state measures – the ECT is not an insurance policy against poor investment 
decisions. It is plausible that due to the falling demand of energy produced through coal and 
oil in a number of ECT contracting parties, such investments may well lose their value 
without any state interference.242 It is possible that state measures have contributed to the loss 
of value, in which cases the tribunal must assess to what degree: investors should not be able 
to successfully claim full losses, when majority of them have been caused by poor investment 
decisions rather than state measures. These are, however, arguments of a factual nature, 
rather than legal and therefore receive minor considerations. 
There are numerous challenges to overcome when formulating litigation techniques. Firstly, 
this exercise takes place in the abstract – they are not geared towards any particular situation, 
but rather operate on a more general level. Therefore, the focus has to be more on the law, 
rather than the facts. Secondly, there is no public arbitral award that would consider such 
environmental measures in the ECT context, and the actual memorials brought forward by the 
parties of a dispute have never been made public. Although the tribunals would not be bound 
by previous awards even if such existed, such awards would nevertheless offer hints 
regarding what type of arguments the parties have put forward, and how the arbitrators have 
considered them. Despite these challenges, it is possible to recognise certain key arguments 
that would be worthwhile for states to explore if faced with an investor claim due to their 
environmental measures.  
4.3.1.2. Responding to Expropriation Claims 
As was established in Chapter 2, states are obligated to pay in full the fair market value of the 
expropriated property, if expropriation has indeed taken place. Thus, the first key goal of a 
responding state, at the merits phase, is to successfully defend itself against expropriation 
claims based on Article 13 of the ECT. Various tribunals have discussed expropriation under 
the ECT. In the first ECT arbitral award, in Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia 
(“Nykomb v. Latvia”), the tribunal rejected Nykomb’s expropriation claims stating that: 
“The tribunal finds that "regulatory takings" may under the circumstances amount to 
expropriation or the equivalent of an expropriation. The decisive factor for drawing 
the border line towards expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession 
 
under the ECT. In Blusun v. Italy, the respondent argued that the applicant would not have the necessary locus 
standi to bring forth the case due to failing to conduct an EIA and thus having unclean hands. The tribunal 
rejected the clean hands argument, although eventually ruled in favour of the respondent state. See [156, 272-
276]. 
242 This was briefly considered above, see supra note 2. 
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taking or control over the enterprise the disputed measures entail. In the present case, 
there is no possession taking of [Nykomb] or its assets, no interference with the 
shareholder's rights or with the management's control over and running of the 
enterprise apart from ordinary regulatory provisions laid down in the production 
license, the off-take agreement, etc.”243 
In Nykomb v. Latvia, the tribunal clearly put more weight on whether, and to what extent, 
possession or control had been transferred to the state. In contrast, in later case-law, the 
tribunals have emphasised the impact the contested measures have had to the value of the 
investment. In AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. V. Republic of 
Hungary (“AES v. Hungary (II)”) arbitration, the tribunal set the standard for expropriation as 
follows: 
“It is evident many state’s acts or measures can affect investments and a modification 
to an existing law or regulation is probably one of the most common of such acts or 
measures. Nevertheless, a state’s act that has a negative effect on an investment 
cannot automatically be considered an expropriation. For an expropriation to occur, it 
is necessary for the investor to be deprived, in whole or in significant part, of the 
property in or in effective control of its investment: or for its investment to be 
deprived, in whole or significant part, of its value.”244 
Although what constitutes a significant part is not defined, in the abovementioned award it is 
stated that the continuance of substantial revenues from investments proves that the value of 
the investment has not substantially diminished.245 AES v. Hungary (II) already sets a high 
threshold for expropriation claims, yet other arbitration proceedings have set even stricter 
qualifications for measures equivalent to expropriation. In National Grid P.L.C v. Argentine 
Republic, the tribunal found that “the effect that the measures concerned must have [for there 
to be indirect expropriation]: neutralization, radical deprivation, irretrievable loss, inability to 
use, enjoy or dispose of the property.”246 The tribunal further adds that as the property has not 
been rendered ‘worthless’ by state action, there has been no expropriation.247 Thus, for 
 
243 Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, SCC, Award (16 December 2003) [4.3.1] 
244 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. V. Republic of Hungary, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/22), Award (23 September 2010) [14.3.1] 
The case concerned “price decrees” passed by the Hungarian government in order to rein in the profits of energy 
companies, the tribunal found that Hungary had not breached its substantive obligations under the ECT. 
245 Ibid [14.3.3] 
246 National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (3 November 2008) [149] 
247 Ibid [154] 
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investor’s claims of expropriation to succeed, they would have to meet the high threshold test 
of establishing that the contested state measures have rendered their investment practically 
worthless, or that they have lost control of said property due to the measures.248 This same 
high threshold of rendering an investment worthless, or destroying its value has also been 
embraced in the ECT context. In Charanne B.v., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v. The 
Kingdom of Spain (“Charanne v. Spain”), which is among the Spanish solar cases, the 
tribunal found that there could only be indirect expropriation if the contested measures 
destroyed the value of the investment. A simple decrease in the value of the shares cannot 
constitute an indirect expropriation, unless the loss of value can be considered equivalent to a 
deprivation of property.249 
Some authors250 have argued that a responding state could defend against certain 
expropriation claims by relying on Article 19 obligations, or on a so called police powers 
doctrine.251 However, the strict formulation of Article 13, and its exclusion from Article 24 
exceptions, means that the degree to which states could use environmental aspects of the ECT 
or rely on the police powers doctrine to combat expropriation claims is limited. Under the 
ECT, it is not significant whether the measures were taken to protect the environment: if the 
measures cause an investor to lose either the control or the value of their investment, 
compensation must be paid, as Wälde and Kolo have argued.252  
However, the arbitral practice under the ECT has shown that tribunals very rarely find that 
Article 13 of the ECT would have been breached.253 Therefore the narrow scope of 
respondent’s ability to rely on Article 19 provisions against expropriation claims is not as 
 
248 Johnson (2009) 11151 
249 Charanne B.v., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v. The Kingdom of Spain, Arbitration No.: 062/2012, Final 
Award (21 January 2016) [464] – [467] 
250 See supra note 10.  
251 Police powers doctrine is an assertion that state measures, if taken in good faith and for legitimate purposes, 
cannot constitute expropriation and it has been argued that measures to protect the environment would fall under 
such doctrine. See Amandine van den Berghe, ‘Legal opinion on Uniper’s legally misconceived ISDS threat to 
Dutch coal phase-out’ (ClientEarth 21 November 2019) accessed at https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-
content/uploads/library/2019-11-26-clientearth-legal-opinion-isds-threat-uniper-ce-en.pdf on 14 July 2020. 
 
Although I agree with many of van den Berghe’s findings and conclusions, I disagree with the reliance on the 
police powers doctrine, as said doctrine does not find support within the provisions of the ECT, and the same 
result could be achieved by relying on the tests that have been established in arbitral practice discussed above, 
and as van den Berghe has also argued in the same opinion.  
252 Wälde & Kolo (2001) 846 
253 According to the database kept by the ECT Secretariat, the arbitration tribunals have found Article 13 to have 
been breached in five cases, most of which are related to the Yukos arbitration. 
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problematic as it might seem. The scope of the environmental defence is, however, much 
wider against alleged breaches of ECT Article 10, as discussed below. 
4.3.1.3. Responding to Alleged Breaches of Article 10 
The very first paragraph of the UNCTAD report on FET standard states that “FET has 
emerged as the most relied upon and successful basis for IIA (International Investment 
Agreement) claims by investors.”254 Investors often rely on FET claims in conjunction with 
expropriation claims, and tribunals have often ruled in favour of the investors in such 
cases.255 Whereas Article 13 rigidly sets a high threshold for claimants, and an equally strict 
payment obligation for states should the threshold be met, Article 10 provisions are much 
more malleable, in particular due to the unqualified formulation of the FET standard found in 
the ECT. Thus, a responding state must be prepared to argue against Article 10 claims, FET 
in particular, as well.256 The respondent’s defence would need to begin by challenging the 
investors’ claims regarding a breach of Article 10 obligations, which is covered under the 
current heading. Should this prove unsuccessful, the respondent may still rely upon the 
allowed exceptions to Article 10, which is discussed below. In any event, the respondent may 
rely on international law of a more general nature, such as the Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”)257, which is recognised widely as 
customary international law. However, arguments based on such sources of international law 
are beyond the scope of this presentation. 
As the formulation of Article 10 allows for practically any situation to possibly fall under its 
scope, some limitations must be made in this regard. The focus is on alleged breaches 
regarding 1) fair and equitable treatment standard, and 2) alleged unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures. These have been chosen, as they are among the most often invoked 
provisions in investor-state disputes. 
 
254 UNCTAD (2012) 1 
255 Johnson (2009) 11153  
256 ECT Art 10, as discussed under Chapter 2, contains several other clauses beside the FET standard. However, 
it seems less likely that a respondent could successfully rely on environmental grounds against e.g. alleged 
breaches of the MFN standard. In any event, the inter-linkages of Article 10 obligations mean that the clauses 
should be seen as supporting each other. Thus, a situation that would possibly fall under another Article 10(1) 
clause, can nevertheless be brought up under FET standard. 
257 ARSIWA Arts 20-26 concern circumstances precluding wrongfulness. Due to the strict criteria of the 
applicability of these articles, it seems unlikely that a defence relying on ARSIWA in ECT context would be 
successful. 
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Tribunals have widely accepted that the FET standard protects the legitimate expectations of 
the investor and a related concept of legal stability.258 This means that if legitimate 
expectations have been created, they need to be protected and that the legal framework in 
which the investment was made must remain relatively stable. The more precise nature of 
these concepts has been discussed by various tribunals, although in the ECT context often in 
cases, where the state is in fact cutting back on environmental-friendly policies. This may 
lead to a problematic situation for progressive tribunals – whether to place weight on the 
sovereign right to regulate or aim to disincentivise states from cutting back on 
environmentally friendly policies.259 
In Blusun v. Italy, the tribunal relied on several previous arbitrations on its stance regarding 
legitimate expectations of the investors, directly quoting Charanne v. Spain, El Paso v. 
Argentina and Philip Morris v. Uruguay260 tribunals.261 In Charanne v. Spain the tribunal 
stated that: 
“under international law … in the absence of specific commitment toward stability, an 
investor cannot have a legitimate expectation that a regulatory framework such as that 
at issue in this arbitration is to not be modified at any time to adapt to the needs of the 
market and to the public interest.”262 
El Paso v. Argentina tribunal found similarly that: 
“Under a FET clause, a foreign investor can expect that the rules will not be changed 
without justification of an economic, social or other nature. Conversely, it is 
unthinkable that a State could make a general commitment to all foreign investors 
never to change its legislation whatever the circumstances, and it would be 
unreasonable for an investor to rely on such a freeze.”263 
Thus, it is clear that general legislation of a state is not equivalent to a specific promise made 
to an investor. Therefore, an investor cannot legitimately expect for the legislation of any 
given moment to remain unchanged. This rule would also apply to cases, where the dispute 
 
258 Whitsitt & Bankes (2013) 223 
259 Areta Jez, 'Environmental Policy-Making and Tribunal Decision-Making: Assessing the Scope of Regulatory 
Power in International Investment Arbitration' (2019) 40 U Pa J Int'l L 989 1004, 1007 
260 See supra note 55 for the quoted section of the award. 
261 Blusun v. Italy [367] – [369] 
262 Charanne v. Spain [510] 
263 El Paso v. Argentina [372] 
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concerned state measures aimed at the protection of the environment. Blusun v. Italy tribunal 
also added its own considerations to the quoted sections of previous cases: 
“International law does not make binding that which was not binding in the first 
place, nor render perpetual what was temporary only. In the present case, the 
expectations are even less powerful because European law had already lowered them: 
it was clear that the incentives offered were subject to modification in light, inter alia, 
of changing costs and improved technology”264 
The Blusun v. Italy tribunal thus also considered the surrounding legal environment of the 
dispute. In a case of another nature, the tribunal might have considered the Climate 
Emergency declared by the EU265, or the various environmental treaties concluded since the 
entry into force of the ECT. This, paired with the plethora of environmental aspects of the 
ECT, including the many recommended measures to protect the environment, would allow 
for states to defend themselves against legitimate expectation claims. 
Investor claims based on the state obligation to provide a stable legal framework is closely 
related to the legitimate expectations – the key issue is whether states have committed to not 
regulate certain matters through, e.g. stabilisation clauses.266 Regarding the investor’s claims 
that the Italian measures to change renewable energy incentives breached its obligations of 
maintaining legal stability, the Blusun v. Italy tribunal found that the threshold for such 
claims is relatively high.267 It relied on the findings of the El Paso v. Argentina and LG&E v. 
Argentina tribunals, which speak of “total alteration of the entire legal setup for foreign 
investments”268 and “completely dismantling the very legal framework constructed to attract 
investors.”269 Thus, it is clear that the threshold for breaching legal stability obligations is 
high. However, the situation may change in cases of different nature. It seems plausible that 
state measures to protect the environment, especially if such measures are ambitious, would 
upend the legal framework more drastically than mere changes to the profit incentives of 
renewable energy. For example, in Rockhopper v. Italy, an ongoing dispute arising from 
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Italy’s ban on coastal oil drilling270, it is plausible that the investor would claim that the state 
measure would breach its obligations to maintain legal stability, as it would not merely cut 
profits, but prohibit a certain type of conduct altogether.  
In such cases, a state ought to base its arguments on the fact that ECT does not contain an 
explicit stabilisation clause, but rather the general obligation not to subvert the legal 
regime.271 A state could also, based on this finding, argue that measures to protect the 
environment can hardly constitute a subversion of a legal regime, as the ECT and most 
national constitutions272 contain provisions regarding the protection of the environment. 
Thus, the question the tribunal must answer to in such cases, is how broadly the concept of 
legal regime is understood. Is it the entire regime or a given field of law, or could the 
alteration of a single law cause such subversion that legal stability has been upended?  
Thus far, I have shown that under ECT Article 10 states retain the right to regulate without 
breaching legitimate expectations or legal stability, unless the state has made specific 
commitments. However, Article 10 sets out limitations to this power – any such regulation 
must not be unreasonable or discriminatory towards foreign investors. This means that for the 
state to avoid breaching the investors’ rights, the measures must be proportional, i.e. the 
private loss must be proportionate to the public gain, and that the measures must affect 
domestic investors as they affect foreign ones. The proportionality test comes into play in 
particular in situations where the threshold of expropriation is not met, but the investor still 
wishes to pursue legal relief. European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”) jurisprudence on the free 
movement of goods and persons offers insight as to how these tests are to be understood.273 
The Danish bottles case,274 in particular, proves useful in this. The case concerned Danish 
law requiring drink containers to be returnable and re-usable to some degree.275 The ECJ 
found that albeit the goals were laudable, they nevertheless constituted an indirect limitation 
to the trade of imported products. Therefore, the measure was disproportioned to the goal of 
 
270 It has been stated above that Italy has withdrawn from the ECT. However, the ECT Article 47(3) contains a 
so-called ‘zombie-clause’, which allows for investors to rely on ECT provisions for 20 years following the date 
of withdrawal. Thus, it was possible for Rockhopper to lodge its claims under the ECT, even though Italy had 
withdrawn from the Treaty at that point. 
271 Blusun v. Italy [363] – [364] 
272 David R. Boyd, ‘The Status of Constitutional Protection for the Environment in Other Nations’ (David 
Suzuki Foundation 2013) 23 
273 Wälde & Kolo (2001) 827, 832-835 
274 ECJ, Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark, [1988] ECR 4607 
275 Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials 6th Edition (OUP 2015) 709 
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the regulation.276 Although the aforementioned case concerned the EEC treaty rather than the 
ECT, it is nevertheless a useful analogy of the obligations as mentioned earlier.  
If it seems that state measures affect foreign investors discriminately, the chance that a state 
could successfully defend its actions based on the environmental aspects of the treaty is 
seemingly slim. However, if the measures affect foreign and domestic actors similarly, as 
bona fide environmental regulations ought to, the situation changes. Climate change left 
unchecked would mean such drastic consequences that states may argue for almost any 
measures to be proportionate in relation to the aim of them.277 Such defence may not absolve 
a state’s compensation obligation yet may well convince the tribunal to order lower 
compensations to be paid. 
Article 10 is among the most complicated articles in the ECT due to its open formulation. 
The formulation allows for the tribunal to take into consideration the ECT as a whole, 
including the environmental aspects. Furthermore, even if a state seems to have breached 
Article 10 obligations, it is still possible that a state has not breached its ECT obligations, as 
the exceptions found in Article 24 partially apply to Article 10 as discussed below. 
4.3.1.4. Applicability of Exceptions on Environmental Grounds 
The Energy Charter Treaty contains several exceptions to the aforementioned investment 
protection rules found in Article 24. Furthermore, GATT exceptions apply in certain trade 
situations.278 Under this heading it is argued that these exceptions could apply in disputes 
arising from state measures to protect the environment. The focus will be on the aspects of 
Article 24 that could have significance in the environmental matters, and therefore certain 
subparagraphs will not be discussed.  
Article 24(1) states that its provisions “shall not apply to Article 12, 13 and 29.” Thus, as has 
been stated before, if a state is found to have expropriated foreign investments, it must pay 
compensations – exceptions do not apply in such situations. Article 24(2) contains a key 
limitation for the ability of states to rely on Article 24 exceptions to defend their measures to 
protect the environment. The article states that: 
 
276 Danish bottles [21-22] 
277 Such interpretation is supported by the ECT preamble, which calls for an “urgent need for measures to 
protect the environment” as discussed under Chapter 3. 
278 Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Understanding 15: “Exceptions contained in the 
GATT and Related Instruments apply between particular Contracting Parties which are parties to the GATT, as 
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 “The provisions of this Treaty other than  
(a) those referred to in paragraph (1); and  
(b) with respect to subparagraph (i), Part III of the Treaty 
shall not preclude any Contracting Party from adopting or enforcing any measure  
(i) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”279  
Part III of the Treaty concerns the promotion and protection of investment and includes 
Article 10, provisions of which have been discussed above. The strict formulation of Article 
24(2)(i) seems, at first glance, rather damning for the argument that measures to protect the 
environment could fall under Article 24. Arguably, most measures to protect the environment 
would most readily fit under the scope of measures necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health. 
Such strict formulation offers a high level of protection to investors, especially when 
compared to the provisions of GATT Article XX relating to trade, Articles XX(b)280 and 
XX(g)281 in particular. GATT is quite explicit on the point that health is more important than 
trade.282 Furthermore, GATT allows for exceptions to be made if they are related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, such as clean air.283 The ECT makes numerous 
references to GATT but takes a notably strict approach in its investment rules when 
compared to its trade rules. Thus, it seems evident that Article 24 exceptions would not apply 
if the aim of the contested measure was only the protection of the life or health of humans, 
animals or plants. Such a policy point, which seemingly places more value on the protection 
of investments than the protection of human lives, is very unusual, as admitted even by the 
claimant in a rare case where Article 24 was discussed.284 The tribunal in RWE Innogy 
GMBH and RWE Innogy Aersa S.A.U. v. Kingdom of Spain (“RWE Innogy v. Spain”) offered 
the following analysis to make such policy more understandable:  
 
279 ECT, Art 24(2) 
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“[The Tribunal] considers that the limitation of general exception in Article 24(2) 
with respect to human life etc is more readily comprehensible if the ECT Contracting 
Parties understood themselves to be adopting a series of confined investment 
protections in Part III such that, for example, a regulation adopted to protect human 
life would not be regarded as unfair and inequitable unless it was arbitrary or 
discriminatory or in some other way contrary to customary international law.”285 
The tribunal’s interpretation in RWE Innogy v. Spain indeed makes Article 24(2) formulation 
much more reasonable. The tribunal is effectively saying that bona fide measures to protect 
human life, among other things, should not be found to be in breach of the investment 
protection provisions of the ECT. Such formulation is certainly more acceptable than the 
investor’s position in the above case that “under the ECT investor protection was being 
prioritized over the protection of human life.”286 
In any event, should a state measure concerning the protection of the environment be deemed 
to have breached Article 10 of the ECT, Article 24(3) still allows for the respondent to argue 
that such measures were lawful under the ECT, as it makes an exception to the exception 
rules of Article 24(2), by stating that: 
“The provisions of this Treaty other than those referred to in paragraph (1) shall not 
be construed to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any measure which it 
considers necessary:  
(a) for the protection of its essential security interests including those  
(i) relating to the supply of Energy Materials and Products to a military 
establishment; or 
(ii) taken in time of war, armed conflict or other emergency in international 
relations;  
(b) …; or  
(c) for the maintenance of public order. 
Such measures shall not constitute a disguised restriction on Transit.”287 
 
285 Ibid, emphasis added 
286 Ibid  
287 ECT Art 24(3) 
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First of all, it is clear that Article 24(3) exceptions cover Article 10 obligations, as only 
provisions referred to in paragraph (1) are not within the scope of the Article 24(3) 
exceptions. Secondly, the formulation of the paragraph confers broad discretion to states as to 
when the paragraph’s provisions would apply. The provisions of the ECT do not prevent any 
Contracting Party from taking any measure it considers necessary, i.e. the ECT contains a 
‘self-judging’ exception regarding security and public order. Whether such a provision is 
self-judging or not is significant288, as it has some effect on the level of scrutiny a tribunal 
assigns such claims. Essentially, self-judging provisions would be subject to a ‘good faith 
review’ and non-self-judging provisions would be subject to a more substantive review to 
examine whether the state of necessity meets the conditions laid down in customary 
international law.289 However, it remains unclear as to what the degree of difference between 
such reviews would be, with the LG&E v. Argentina tribunal suggesting that the review 
would not be significantly different, whether the provision in question were self-judging or 
not.290  
Based on the above, if a state can in good faith argue that its measures to protect the 
environment, which might breach Article 10 obligations, were taken for the protection of its 
essential security interests or the maintenance of public order, said state may not be held 
liable for the breach.291 Although such an interpretation of Article 24(3) would probably have 
seemed a stretch during the negotiation period in the early 1990s, the plausibility may have 
increased since. Climate change is widely being recognised as a security issue, rather than 
only an environmental one, whether it is due to resource shortages, population migration, or 
other factors indirectly caused by climate change.292 The self-judging nature of the ECT 
Article 24(3), and many indirect links between climate change and security could allow for a 
 
288 Countries such as the USA and Russia have in fact argued that self-judging provisions would actually be 
jurisdictional questions, and if invoked, the matter would fall outside the jurisdiction of dispute settlement 
bodies. Such interpretation was, however, rejected by the WTO Panel in Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic 
in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) [7.102]. 
289 Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, ‘If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute 
Settlement’ (2009) 13 Max Planck UNYB 110-113. 
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state to argue, that its measures that protect the environment fall under ‘measures the state 
considers necessary to protect essential security interests’. Support for this argument can be 
found in some courts’ jurisprudence: In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros the ICJ found that Hungary’s 
concerns for the environment indeed constituted an “essential interest” of the State293 but the 
ICJ did not find such concerns to be of “imminent” nature.294 The US Supreme Court has, 
however, found in Massachusetts v. EPA that even though the negative effects of climate 
change may occur over a long period of time, it nevertheless creates an actual or imminent 
risk of harm.295 
Despite these factors, the highly complex nature of climate change and the high level of 
protection conferred to investors would make the prospects of such argument highly 
uncertain at least for the time being.296 The defence based on security interests still seems 
better grounded than one relying on the maintenance of public order, which is discussed 
below.  
As has been noted above, the very wording of Article 24(3)(c), to which these interpretations 
are based on, is unclear. The English version of the ECT speaks of measures that a state 
considers necessary ‘for the maintenance of public order’, whereas the French version reads 
‘au maintien de l’ordre public’. Albeit the literal translation of ordre public is indeed public 
order, the significance of the French concept of ordre public is slightly different and 
resembles more closely the concept of public policy, rather than that of public order.297 
Whereas ‘public order’ can be understood as a narrow provision, one concerned with matters 
such as preventing civil unrest, etc.,298 the meaning of public policy is much broader. Public 
policy, as a legal term, concerns situations where the application of foreign law would violate 
fundamental principles of justice or conception of good morals,299 and as a more generic term 
‘public policy’ could apply to an even wider array of situations. As both the English and 
French versions of the text are equally authentic, a respondent may argue based on the much 
wider concept of public policy. In which case, a state could argue that its measures to protect 
 
293 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project [53] 
294 Ibid [55] 
295  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 37 ELR 20075 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
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299 Gary J. Simson, ‘The Public Policy Doctrine in Choice of Law: A Reconsideration of Older Themes’ (1974) 
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the environment fall under public policy. This claim would find support in the fact that the 
protection of the environment is often codified in the constitutions of states. However, the 
fluid nature of public policy doctrine seemingly makes it suitable for only the most egregious 
cases, and even then, the prospects of such an argument succeeding seem poor, as it would 
arguably broaden the scope of Article 24(3)(c) considerably. 
4.3.1.5. Summary 
Above I have discussed various approaches a state could take in responding to investor 
claims targeting their environmental measures. A state would need to combat claims based 
both on Articles 10 and 13, with defence against Article 13 being the priority, as a breach of 
expropriation rules obligates the state to pay full compensation. In contrast, breaches of 
Article 10 usually result in lesser compensation obligations. Although bona fide 
environmental measures should, in most cases, not be deemed to be in breach of the ECT 
investment protection provisions, sometimes this might be the case. In such situations, states 
can still rely on Article 24 exceptions to some degree. However, it seems unlikely that the 
same tribunal that has ruled the environmental measures to be in breach of ECT Article 10 in 
the first place would then agree on their justifiability based on either essential security 
interests or maintenance of public order or ordre public.  
Having identified these varying approaches to the most common investor claims and 
developed a novel interpretation of the object and purpose of the ECT, I discuss what kind of 
effect their application potentially would have had in an actual investor-state dispute under 
the ECT. This is done in comparison with how the dispute in fact played out. 
4.3.2. Applying the Findings: Case Study of Vattenfall v. Germany (I) 
As discussed above, Bankes and Whitsitt have identified four categories of disputes that arise 
in the energy sector.300 In the context of this paper, the third category identified by Bankes 
and Whitsitt is of primary interest, namely disputes arising from host states seeking to 
enhance their environmental or social regulatory regimes; and the fourth identified category 
is of secondary interest, namely disputes that arise when the host states seek to withdraw 
from policies that incentivise certain ways to produce energy. These types of disputes often 
have a clear environmental aspect to them, yet the responding state would utilise very 
different techniques as it would seek to either emphasise the significance of the 
 
300 See supra note 238. 
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environmental aspects of the ECT, or downplay them, depending on the nature of the 
contested measures. 
There are, however, two main challenges to conducting a thorough case study of ECT 
disputes in which the interpretations made within this paper would potentially have made a 
difference. Firstly, ECT disputes are relatively confidential. The parties to an investment 
arbitration under ECT Article 26 are not obliged to make the existence of a dispute public, let 
alone to publish any of the documents related to it. Effectively, this means that the available 
material on disputes is very scarce – although the parties in most known disputes have 
published the possible awards rendered by the tribunal, there are virtually no disputes in 
which the memoranda of the parties would have been made public. Therefore, there is no way 
to accurately assess which arguments have been brought forward by the parties or how they 
have been presented.301 Secondly, there is a scarcity of known disputes falling under the third 
category, and none with a public award to be analysed.302 On the other hand, several awards 
have been rendered on disputes falling under the fourth category, in particular relating to the 
various solar energy incentivisation schemes in various countries. Despite these obstacles, the 
analysis below is focused on the Vattenfall v. Germany (I) dispute, which concerned a coal 
power plant in Germany. Although there is no public award to be studied, the findings made 
within this paper can nevertheless be applied to the known facts of the dispute. Investigating 
a dispute arising from a state seeking to enhance its environmental regime is of particular 
importance, as it remains largely unexplored by ECT tribunals, and as it seems likely that 
such cases are becoming more commonplace.303 
Publicly available information regarding Vattenfall v. Germany (I) is scarce as the only public 
document is the applicant’s Request for Arbitration, which offers only the investors’ view of 
the dispute, and the settlement agreement, which does not contain material details. The 
dispute seemingly arose from Hamburg placing, after the initiation of construction works, 
further requirements relating to the protection of the waters of the River Elbe, which 
 
301 Although the tribunals do refer to the arguments made by the parties in their considerations, this is often done 
passingly and not in great detail. Such practice does not allow for the arguments and their successfulness to be 
accurately assessed. The confidentiality is glaring especially when compared to NAFTA disputes, where the 
parties to the disputes make most of the documents public. 
302 Only the following ECT disputes can be characterised to clearly fall under the third category: Vattenfall v. 
Germany (I) & (II), Rockhopper v. Italy, and the very recent Aura Energy Limited v. Sweden, arising from 
Sweden’s ban on mining uranium. Out of these disputes, only Vattenfall v. Germany (I) has been concluded. 
303 This seems evident, as there are currently at least three active disputes concerning measures to enhance 
environmental regime, and situations in which the investors have strongly hinted at launching ECT cases against 
states passing such regulations, e.g. Uniper against the Netherlands for phasing out the use of coal for energy. 
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according to Vattenfall would have made the operation of the plant uneconomical.304 
Vattenfall claimed that these measures to protect the environment breached Germany’s 
obligations under the ECT, and in their Request for Arbitration alleged breaches of both 
Article 10 and 13.305 The parties to the dispute ended up settling the case, however, the 
details of the settlement are not known publicly. 
Had Germany utilised techniques and interpretations resembling those made within this 
paper, the trajectory of the dispute would arguably have been utterly different, as the joint 
application of the publicly known facts of the disputes and the findings of this paper would 
have placed Germany in a position in which it could have litigated the dispute with success, 
rather than effectively capitulating to the investors’ interests by settling the case. This 
discussion is focused on the merits phase of Vattenfall v. Germany (I).  
First, Germany could have made the argument that the object and purpose of the ECT is both 
the protection of investments and the environment. This is an important step, which serves 
several purposes by laying the basis for the following arguments which utilise the 
environmental aspects of the ECT; and by forcing the investors to take stance regarding the 
object and purpose of the ECT. The applicant would need to downplay the significance of the 
environmental aspects of the ECT, essentially leading to an argument that the Preamble of the 
ECT should not be given much importance.306 It does not seem likely that an argument 
actively aiming to strip the Preamble of significance would be successful under the ECT 
regime.307 Thus, the explicit inclusion of environmental aspects to the dispute would serve to 
benefit the responding state in disputes that arise from them seeking to enhance their 
environmental protection regimes. 
In Vattenfall v. Germany (I) the applicant alleged that the contested measures, namely the 
stricter requirements for a water permit and extended monitoring period of the power plant’s 
effects to fish stock, would have breached Articles 10 and 13. Thus, the primary objective of 
the responding state would be to combat the expropriation claims. The applicant would have 
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needed to argue that the contested measures would have ‘destroyed the value’ of the 
investment, as it is evident that the investors would not have lost control or the ownership of 
the property due to the contested measures. Although the exact content of the stricter 
requirements is not known, Hamburg has argued that they were set merely to meet the 
requirements of EU legislation.308 It seems unlikely that such measures would have rendered 
the value of the investment worthless, as the investors could have either complied with the 
regulations and operated the plant more sustainably albeit with higher setting-up costs, or 
converted it to an altogether different type of power plant.309 Thus, the respondent would 
arguably have a high probability of combatting expropriation claims, even without relying on 
the police powers doctrine, which was touched upon above. 
Assessing the investors’ Article 10 claims is particularly difficult, as there is scarce public 
information on the details of the dispute. The investors argued that Germany had breached 
ECT Article 10 by imposing restrictions under the water permit that are incompatible with 
earlier agreements; that the investors were not heard properly during the process; and that the 
extended period of monitoring the fish-stair was an unreasonable measure towards the 
investors.310 Overall, the investors have framed the question as entirely politically motivated 
and have not acknowledged that the respondent may have had legitimate environmental 
motivations for the measures. Thus, Germany could have argued that the measures were 
passed due to legitimate environmental concerns, and that investors cannot have legitimate 
expectations to perpetually pollute at a level that has been acceptable in the past. However, 
the extended period of monitoring the effectiveness of the fish-stair would potentially be 
problematic: one-year monitoring period, and Vattenfall building an additional fish-stair had 
already been agreed upon, and the decision by Hamburg to extend the monitoring period to 
two years seems arbitrary. As the protection of animal health and life is explicitly stated to 
fall outside the scope of allowed exceptions to Article 10, it is unlikely that Germany could 
have successfully relied on Article 24(3) exceptions either, as the health of fish population, 
albeit important, would be difficult to frame as an essential security interest, or one of 
maintaining public order. Also, if the investors’ right of due process was indeed violated by 
German authorities, it would be difficult to defend against claims of Article 10 breaches. This 
 
308 Bernasconi (2009) 1 
309 Some coal power plants have converted to burn biomass instead, although the environmental benefits of this 
are unclear as it requires the clearing of forests. Another option, one that Germany in particular has explored, is 
to convert them into batteries to store renewable energy. See https://energytransition.org/2019/05/coal-plants-
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is, however, difficult to assess as the only piece of documentation suggesting this is provided 
by the applicant. 
As the above analysis is based on the scarcely available information of a settled case, it is 
bound to be hypothetical. Nevertheless, certain assumptions can be made of the potential 
result the dispute would have had, had Germany relied on the interpretations and techniques 
made within this paper. The dispute would not have been settled, and thus the tribunal would 
have had to take a stance on the significance of the environmental aspects of the ECT, which 
would have had a significant impact on the field no matter how the arbitrators ruled. It seems 
likely, that the tribunal would have rejected the applicant’s claim of Article 13 breach, as the 
they would have retained the ownership of the plant, and the investments value would not 
have been destroyed, even though its value would probably have decreased. It is possible, 
however, that the tribunal would have found some breaches of Article 10. Although the aims 
of the measures are laudable, the measures may have been out of proportion for their stated 
purposes, in particular the doubling of the monitoring period of the effectiveness of the fish-
stair. Thus, the result would have likely been that Germany would have been found to be in 
breach of Article 10 in some ways alleged by the applicant, but not all. The tribunal would 
have likely ordered some compensation to be paid, but not the full amount claimed by the 
investors, and the measures to protect the Elbe would be sustained. Whether the now evident 
falling demand for coal energy311 would have borne any significance is a different question 
altogether, as Vattenfall v. Germany (I) dispute took place in 2009 when the trend might still 
have been difficult to predict. 
It is possible that had the measures been more specifically targeted towards coal power 
plants, rather than being vaguely targeted towards industry along the Elbe, the trajectory of 
the dispute would have been different, and more beneficial towards the respondent. This 
seems plausible, as the harmfulness of burning coal is well documented, and thus the 
threshold of measures being unreasonable would arguably be considerably higher in such 
cases.312 
4.3.3. Inter-State Disputes 
Having discussed the significance of environmental aspects in investor-state disputes, I will 
now examine their significance in the inter-state context, which, as the Blusun tribunal found, 
 
311 See supra note 2. 
312 Should the Netherlands’ coal phase out ever be considered by an ECT tribunal, this assessment, and the 
significance of the falling demand for coal energy, will possible be tested. 
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is where the environmental obligations found in Article 19 fit. As has been discussed, the 
formulation of Article 19 obligations makes it fairly difficult for a state to actually breach 
them – their practical effect seems more relevant as a justification for some state measures. 
Despite the formulation, disputes concerning their interpretation are nevertheless possible, 
although no such public case is known. Article 27 of the ECT allows for states to submit their 
disputes to inter-state arbitration. However, this option does not apply to disputes concerning 
the interpretation of Article 19, which states in its second paragraph that: 
“At the request of one or more of Contracting Parties, disputes concerning the 
application or interpretation of provisions of this Article shall, to the extent that 
arrangements for the consideration of such disputes do not exist in other appropriate 
international for a, be reviewed by the Charter Conference aiming at a solution.”313 
This procedure is considerably weaker than that laid out in Article 27, as it only allows for 
the Charter Conference to review the dispute, if it does not fall under the jurisdiction of any 
international forum. Thus, the dispute settlement mechanism for Article 19 obligations is 
rather weak. Furthermore, the Article 19 obligations themselves are relatively weak as well, 
as discussed above in Chapter 3. These factors paired means that it is improbable that 
environmental aspects of the ECT would be of much use in reinforcing legal claims that 
another Contracting Party would have breached their Treaty obligations.314 
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5. Why the Environmental Approach to ECT should be adopted, 
and is it enough? 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Thus far, I have established that the ECT can be interpreted in a more environmentally 
conscious way315 and how such interpretation could be used in practice.316 To answer these 
questions, the Treaty itself has been examined – the discussion has been about the text, 
provisions and application of the Treaty. Under the current chapter, however, I discuss why 
such interpretation should be utilised, and whether this is enough, or does the Treaty require 
changes to its text. To do so, I needed to investigate the broader context in which the Treaty 
is situated, and therefore at times steer away from a purely doctrinal method. I have examined 
the jurisprudence of various courts and tribunals in order to identify if there is a trend towards 
a more sustainable interpretation of the law more broadly, and whether more recently drafted 
investment treaties contain stricter language concerning the environment. Identifying such 
trends is of importance as it is arguable that states responding to ECT claims would be more 
willing to rely on the presented arguments, and tribunals would be more willing to accept 
them, if they can be presented as a part of the continuum of legal development in the field.317 
In essence, a more widespread application of the interpretation presented in this text would 
allow for states to abandon fossil fuels faster, and focus on renewables and, therefore, I have 
discussed the benefits of this transition, although such policy considerations have been kept 
brief. Finally, I have considered if what has been presented in this text would provide for a 
way forward that would not jeopardise either the environment or the protection of 
investments; or if the Treaty indeed requires changes in order to balance these two aspects. 
5.2. Are Environmental Aspects gaining more Significance in various Disputes? 
5.2.1. Cases under the ECT 
Several ECT cases have been referred to over the course of this text, with the tribunals of the 
more contemporary ones beginning to, albeit passingly, consider environmental aspects of the 
cases. The numerous Spanish solar cases, many of which are still ongoing, and the tribunals’ 
 
315 Chapters 2 and 3. 
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317 This was touched upon already under the introductory chapter to this paper. The reliance on precedence and 
analogy is widely used in the field of investment arbitration, and thus it is important to identify the very latest 
strands in this field. 
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treatment of various arguments put forward by the parties offers some evidence of 
environmental aspects gaining significance in ECT disputes. In Eiser v. Spain the tribunal 
found that, “ECT’s emphasis on developing secure long-term energy cooperation is coupled 
with provisions addressing the environmental aspects of energy development” and continues 
by referring to the entire Article 19(1) of the ECT.318 In RWE Innogy v. Spain the tribunal 
found that measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health would not breach ECT 
Part III protections per se.319 
Despite these current hints of environmental aspects seeping into the tribunals’ decisions, 
there has not been a true landmark ECT award that would have pitted the interests of the 
investors strictly against the protection of the environment. Vattenfall v. Germany 
(I),320which is discussed above, had the potential to be such a case that would clarify the 
significance of the environmental aspects of the ECT. The case, however, never produced a 
public award, and the parties instead settled the dispute, with Germany backing on the 
environmental requirements, yet not admitting any wrongdoing. 
It seems that the tribunals applying the ECT are beginning to consider its environmental 
aspects more regularly and that this is a very recent trend. However, the discussed disputes do 
not concern situations where the environmental aspects would take a more central stage in the 
dispute. Until such public dispute arises under the ECT regime321, the environmental aspects 
of the ECT slowly gain more significance, albeit seemingly at an increasing pace. 
5.2.2. Cases and Wordings under other Treaty Regimes 
 
There have been several investor-state disputes arising from environmental measures under 
other investment treaty regimes, in particular in North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) context.322 A detailed investigation and analysis of NAFTA ‘jurisprudence’ is 
outside the scope of this paper. However, NAFTA tribunals have followed similar reasoning 
to ECT tribunals when considering expropriation claims stemming from environmental 
 
318 Eiser Infrastucture Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.À.R.I. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36, Award (4 May 2017) [100]. 
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321 Of the current publicly known cases, the dispute between Rockhopper and Italy arising from Italy’s ban of 
coastal oil drilling is perhaps the most potential for further clarifying the significance of the ECT’s 
environmental provisions. 
322 Philippe Sands et al, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press 2018) 905 
73 
 
measures, often finding that expropriation is dependent on the results of a given measure, not 
on the justification of said measures.323 There is, however, a notable exception to such 
findings: In Methanex v. United States,324 a dispute which arose from California’s ban of 
certain substances, which used methanol as a key component. Methanex, a major producer of 
methanol, claimed, among other things, that the ban was an act tantamount to expropriation 
and initiated arbitration proceedings in 1999.325 The tribunal rejected each of Methanex’ 
claims, and in its findings concerning expropriation stated that: 
“As a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter 
alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable 
unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then 
putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain 
from such regulation”326, and further added that: 
“No such commitments were given to Methanex. Methanex entered a political 
economy in which it was widely known, if not notorious, that governmental 
environmental and health protection institutions at the federal and state level, 
operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, interested corporations, 
nongovernmental organizations and a politically active electorate, continuously 
monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or 
restricted the use of some of those compounds for environmental and/or health 
reasons”327 
Although I agree with the conclusion of the Methanex v. United States tribunal that there was 
no expropriation, I find the reasoning problematic. It seems likely that the tribunal could have 
reached the same conclusion through the already established, and strict, test on whether the 
ownership of the investment has been transferred, or if the value of the investment has been 
 
323 Various tribunals have reached this conclusion when discussing state measures to protect the environment, 
e.g.: Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican states, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 
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destroyed – in Methanex, neither of these had happened. Instead, the tribunal relied on a test 
that is seemingly more apt to FET claims – whether a state has made a specific commitment 
to refrain from certain regulatory measures. As disputes concerning states’ measures to 
protect the environment are often approached through expropriation claims, Methanex v. 
United States can be seen as a significant milestone in allowing states more policy space. 
However, in practice, it has had a somewhat limited impact on investor-state disputes, as it 
did not manage to establish a new test that could be applied to determine which measures are 
‘permissible and non-compensable’.328 It is possible that the Methanex tribunal was too 
ambitious in its reversal of preceding case law as it did not formulate an applicable test – as 
can be seen from more recent ECT cases, such as AEG v. Hungary and Charanne, the ECT 
tribunals have continued to rely on the test of whether the value of the investment has been 
destroyed. 
Outside of actual disputes, it is also worthwhile to briefly examine the relevant provisions of 
more recent treaties and compare those to the provisions of the ECT. Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”)329, in particular, takes a much more clearly 
pronounced stance on states’ right to regulate. In Article 8.9 CETA states that: 
“1. For the purpose of this Chapter, the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within 
their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of 
public health, safety, the environment or public morals, social or consumer protection 
or the promotion and protection of cultural diversity. 
2. For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a 
modification to its laws, in a manner which negatively affects an investment or 
interferes with an investor's expectations, including its expectations of profits, does 
not amount to a breach of an obligation under this Section.”330 
To further accentuate the above point, in CETA Annex 8-A concerning expropriation, it is 
stated that: 
 
328 Saluka Investments BV (the Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award (17 March 2006) 
[262] – [263]; Sands et al (2018) 910-913  
329 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Brussels 14 January 2017, Official Journal of the 
European Union L 11/23 
 
330 CETA Art 8.9 – Investment and regulatory measures 
75 
 
“For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a measure 
or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly 
excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”331 
It is evident that CETA is much more progressive in the acknowledgment of environmental 
matters than the ECT. This is particularly clear in the above segments. CETA is very explicit 
on guaranteeing the states’ right to regulate, whereas the ECT remains relatively quiet about 
the matter in its primary texts. CETA’s approach to expropriation is very different from that 
of the ECT. The Energy Charter Treaty Article 13 states that measures that expropriate or 
have an effect equivalent to expropriation trigger the state obligation to pay full 
compensation, with Article 24 further stating that none of the exceptions apply to Article 13. 
CETA, on the other hand, explicitly states that measures that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, e.g. environment, only rarely constitute 
expropriation. Although the text of the two treaties differs greatly in this regard, the arbitral 
practice under the ECT narrows the divide – arbitrators applying the ECT have found 
expropriation to have taken place very rarely, as has been discussed. 
Furthermore, the ongoing negotiation process of the free trade agreement between the 
European Union and Mercosur states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) (“EU-
MERCOSUR”) arguably offers some evidence of environmental matters as a global interest 
gaining more significance in international trade law. In 2019, during the Amazon fires, 
several European countries implied that they would block the treaty unless Brazil took 
concrete action to protect the Amazon rainforest.332 Although the EU-MERCOSUR is not 
fully comparable to the ECT, as it is not an investment treaty, but rather a trade agreement,333 
it is nonetheless important to recognize that several ECT parties are willing to block a treaty 
which has been negotiated for some 20 years over environmental concerns. 
 
 
331 CETA Annex 8-A – Expropriation  
332 Graham Fahy & Gabriela Baczynska, ‘EU piles pressure on Brazil over Amazon fires’ (Reuters, 23 August 
2019) accessed at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-mercosur-ireland/eu-piles-pressure-on-brazil-over-
amazon-fires-idUSKCN1VD0PJ> on 16 June 2020. 
333 “The agreement extends to all modes of supply. It also covers investment liberalisation (‘establishment’), 
both in the services and non-services sectors. It does not include investment protection standards or dispute 
settlement on investment protection. “New EU-Mercosur trade agreement: The agreement in principle (Brussels 
1 July 2019) 9. 
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5.2.3. Other Cases 
Under this heading I will discuss some very recent case law in an attempt to find further 
evidence on whether environmental values have seeped into the interpretation or application 
of the law. As national courts tied many of the referred cases, it is unlikely that they would be 
referred to in a given ECT dispute, although the arbitrators would certainly be allowed to do 
so as discussed above. This, however, is not problematic, as the object of the current chapter 
is to identify whether there is a broader trend towards a more environmentally sound 
application of law; it must be remembered that the ECT does not exist in a void. The cases 
discussed under this heading do not consider concepts such as expropriation or FET. Instead, 
the discussion is now geared towards the general trends in law around the world. 
To immediately break with what was just stated about recent cases tried in natural courts, I 
will briefly discuss the ICJ case Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, which, fittingly for the current paper, 
concerned an energy infrastructure project along the river Danube. In paragraph 140 of its 
judgment, the Court stated that: 
“Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly 
interfered with nature. In the past this was often done without consideration of the 
effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing 
awareness of the risks for the mankind – for present and future generations – of 
pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and 
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the 
last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weigh, not only when States contemplate new activities, but 
also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile 
economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the 
concept of sustainable development.”334 
This ruling is significant as it confirms that there is a trend of environmental values, such as 
the concept of sustainable development, gaining significance in the application of the law. 
Essentially, the ICJ rewrote parts of the treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia to 
consider the concept of sustainable development it had invoked for the very first time.335  
 
334 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project [140] 
335 Philippe Sands, ‘International Courts and the Application of the Concept of “Sustainable Development”’ 
(1999) Max Planck UNYB 392-394 
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Since Gabčikovo-Nagymaros the ICJ has considered other environmental cases as well, but 
perhaps the clearest evidence of the interpretation and application of the law becoming more 
environmentally conscious can be found from cases tried in a national setting, a phenomenon 
known as climate litigation. In a recent landmark Urgenda case336 the court ordered that the 
Netherlands must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by the end of 2020 by at least 25% 
compared to 1990. The court found that under ECHR Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to 
private and family life) the state is obligated to protect the enjoyment of these rights from the 
threat posed by climate change.337 The court further found that in order to protect these rights, 
each state must ‘do their part’, meaning that a state cannot escape the responsibility by 
arguing that their emissions are small on a global scale and thus reducing them would yield 
little global benefits.338 Based on various international conferences held in the context of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the court established 
that ‘doing their part’ constituted a 25% reduction in emissions for the Netherlands when 
compared to 1990.339 Urgenda is significant, as it confirms that the states have an obligation 
of result to reduce their emissions, rather than an obligation of conduct. Despite the ruling 
taking place in a national context, it might well have significance in future ECT disputes, and 
has already spawned a number of similar litigations in various countries.340 
Another significant climate litigation case is currently ongoing in Norway. The so-called 
People v. Arctic Oil dispute concerns drilling licences granted by Norway, and the demand of 
various environmental organisation that they are revoked. The environmental organisations 
argue that the licences are unlawful with regards to Article 112 of the Norwegian 
Constitution (right to a healthy environment) or, in the alternative, in breach of the 
aforementioned Article 2 and 8 of the ECHR.341 Although the argument made in People v. 
Arctic Oil is relatively similar to the one made in Urgenda in terms of the ECHR, a key 
difference is that while Urgenda concerned general emissions, the case at hand involves 
specific emissions.342 The Supreme Court of Norway has since granted appeal so the final 
ruling might still change. 
 
336 Supreme Court of The Netherlands, The Netherlands v. Stichting Urgenda, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, 
Judgment (20 December 2019) 
337 Ibid [5.2.1.-5.5.3]. 
338 Ibid [5.6.1-5.8]. 
339 Ibid [6.1.-7.3.6] 
340See <https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case/global-climate-litigation/> accessed on 17 June 2020 
341 18-060499ASD-BORG/03, Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court of Norway, 24 February 2020, 2-3 
342 Borgarting Court of Appeal, 18-060499ASD-BORG/03, Judgment (23 January 2020) 35 
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5.2.4. Summary 
I have discussed only a handful of cases above. With the scope of the discussion covering 
rulings and awards from various investment tribunals, international courts and domestic 
courts, it is evident that the presented case law represents only a small number of all 
environmentally significant cases around the world. There is, however, an identifiable trend 
towards environmental values gaining foothold in the application of the law. The growing 
field of climate litigation itself is evidence of this, and the success of the claims in Urgenda 
in particular. This trend has not, as evidenced by publicly known cases, affected foreign 
investment law as significantly yet. However, the language in the more recent investment and 
trade treaties shows that environmental aspects are becoming more significant in the field as 
well. This trend is also recognisable within the ECT context, with RWE Innogy v. Spain being 
perhaps the strongest, and a very recent, indication of this. 
5.3. Policy Considerations 
From a policy point of view, there are various reasons why the findings of this paper ought to 
be applied in state and tribunal practice. Most importantly, it would allow for states to more 
confidently pass bona fide environmental measures, and thus aid in addressing climate 
change. It seems plausible that such environmental measures will become more 
commonplace in any event, as the ‘increasingly urgent need for measures to protect the 
environment’ referred to in the Treaty343, is arguably becoming more urgent than ever. With 
such measures likely becoming more commonplace, the findings of this paper would offer a 
novel take on balancing the interests of the investor and the environment. Finding such 
balance is essential, as the common factor to all energy projects is that they tend to require 
plenty of capital and a long timeline.344 Thus, the interests of the investors must also be 
considered even when discussing the environmental aspects of the ECT, as foreign 
investment in the energy sector still have an important role. I did not fully embrace the 
Methanex award as mentioned earlier partly due to this reason – the tribunal’s findings, if 
widely applied, could lead to a high degree of unpredictability, especially for the foreign 
investors. The formulation offered within this paper, however, arguably would provide for 
predictability in a more sustainable manner, as it does not aim to upend the established 
practice, but rather nudge it towards a more sustainable path by adding the consideration of 
environmental aspects to the established tests, rather than formulate new tests altogether. 
 
343 ECT Preamble 
344 Whitsitt & Bankes (2013) 210 
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Although the cost of producing renewable energy has lowered considerably since the 
negotiations and entry into force of the ECT, coal remains the cheapest, and most polluting, 
method of producing energy.345 Thus, states still have an incentive to use coal rather than 
renewable forms of energy, as it would grant them a competitive edge to some degree.346 This 
creates a dynamic, in which measures to protect the climate benefit all states, but the cost 
would be borne only by the state passing such measures. This dynamic might lead to states 
concluding that it is not their obligation to bear these costs, and thus embrace cheaper, more 
polluting forms of energy.347 This arguably creates a type of n-person prisoners’ dilemma: the 
global utility would increase the most if all states passed measures to protect the 
environment. However, a state may be able to gain more benefits by not passing such 
regulations and trusting that other states will do so.348 Such conduct may then lead to mutual 
distrust among states, and that none or only a few of them pass such measures, leading to a 
worse global utility. However, a key component of traditional prisoners’ dilemma is that the 
prisoners cannot communicate – states can, and certainly should,349 communicate with each 
other to find the best solutions. Therefore, the higher the number of states that truly strive 
towards sustainability in the energy sector, the lower the relative costs associated with the 
benefits are for each such state. Thus, the sooner states begin applying a novel interpretation 
of the ECT, like one presented within this text, the sooner others may follow them in practice 
leading to global benefits. 
5.4. Should the Energy Charter Treaty be amended? 
Thus far in this text, I have investigated the ECT framework as it currently stands and aimed 
to find an interpretation of the Treaty that would strike a balance between the protection of 
the environment and investments. Such interpretation, and potential for its application, was 
found, mainly relying on the teleological approach of interpretation, although never going 
against the actual text of the Treaty itself. The fact that such balancing interpretation can 
plausibly be made means that changes to the ECT are not absolutely necessary – the Treaty in 
 
345 Tomas Kåberger, ‘Progress of renewable electricity replacing fossil fuels’ (2019) Global Energy 
Interconnection, Vol 1, Issue 1, 48-52 
346 The competitive edge would be relevant to the degree that the state considers the savings in the price per unit 
of energy to surpass the reputational damage that a reliance in coal power would arguably carry. 
347 The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement shows that such realpolitik approach to the environment is 
alive and well. 
348 On prisoners’ dilemma in general, and n-person variations of it, see R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, 
Games and Decisions (Dover Publications 1989) 94-102 
349 Art 19 of the ECT in fact creates some communication obligations for the Contracting Parties regarding their 
environmental policies. 
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its current form can serve its purpose of promoting cooperation in the energy sector while 
protecting both the environment and investments.  
However, the consideration is significantly changed when discussing whether the ECT should 
be changed, rather than must it be changed.350 Reforming the ECT has extensive, but not 
uniform, support amongst the Contracting Parties351, and environmental NGOs, with the EU’s 
proposal for the modernisation of the ECT being particularly useful.352 The EU proposes 
several key amendments to the text of the ECT, a number of which are listed below: 1) 
adding a new article to the ECT explicitly stating that states retain the “right to regulate 
within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objective, such as the protection of the 
environment, including combatting climate change…”;353 2) a clarification of the scope of the 
FET clause;354 3) reforming Article 13 to resemble the expropriation clause of the CETA, i.e. 
stating that legitimate public policy objectives “such as the protection of the environment, 
including climate change…” constitute indirect expropriation only in rare circumstances;355 
4) a new article solely concerning sustainable development, with mainly soft law obligations, 
but also some binding obligations;356 and 5) a new article concerning inter-state disputes 
arising from the proposed sustainable development -article.357 In essence, it seems that the 
EU proposal aims at precisely the same result as the interpretation made within this text: a 
better balance between the protection of the environment and investments.358 Therefore, a 
 
350 It is noteworthy that the ECT contains several obsolete sections, and outdated provisions, which themselves 
would warrant a modernization of the Treaty: However, the discussion under this heading is focused on whether 
the environmentally relevant aspects of the ECT should be changed. See CCDEC 2019 08 STR, 45-57 
351 Ibid  
352 Council of the European Union, ECT Modernisation: Revised Draft EU proposal, WK 3927/2020 INIT 
(Brussels 20 April 2020). Document accessed at <www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-plans-to-reform-
energy-charter-treaty-falling-short-activists-say/> on 24 June 2020. 
 
NOTE: The document WK 3927/2020 INIT is marked for limited use, and was, by all indications, leaked. The 
decision to nevertheless refer to it was made because 1) it has been on the public domain since the end of April, 
and still remains findable as of 27 July 2020; 2) the document has already been referred to by an ICSID tribunal, 
see Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank D.D. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on 
Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis (12 
June 2020) note 337; and 3) the EU has since published its text proposal for the modernisation of the ECT, 
which reflects the leaked document, but lacks the explanations for the choices. As the document is already in 
public domain, and has been referred to already, I decided to utilize it for this research. 
353 Ibid 4-5 
354 Ibid 5-6 
355 Ibid 8 
356 Ibid 10-12 
357 Ibid Explanatory Note 
358 The EU proposal does unfortunately fall short on many accounts, however. As welcome as the proposed 
changes would be, they would not in fact add much new to the ECT framework, as has been argued throughout 
this text. The proposal furthermore fails to propose an amendment that would differentiate between renewable 
and non-renewable forms of energy, which would be an important distinction to make. 
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large part of the proposed ‘changes’ would not actually be changing the provisions, but rather 
explicitly confirming interpretations made within this text, should the proposal pass as is. The 
EU’s proposal for the amendment of Article 13 is the exception to this. The proposed 
formulation would materially change the provisions regarding expropriation, as the current 
form is quite clear on that expropriation is identified through the effect of the contested 
measures, not through the motivation behind the measures. Should Article 13 be changed this 
way, an award utilising the findings of the Methanex v. United States would fit the ECT 
framework much better than it would currently. 
Thus, it is easy to accept that the Energy Charter Treaty should in fact be modernised, so it 
more would more explicitly take environmental aspects into consideration.  
As welcome as modernisation of the ECT would be, it is nevertheless difficult to achieve: 
Article 36 of the ECT sets that: 
“(1) Unanimity of the Contracting Parties Present and Voting at the meeting of the 
Charter Conference … shall be required for decisions by the Charter Conference to: 
(a) adopt amendments to this Treaty other amendments to Articles 45 and 35 
and Annex T;”359 
Thus, an unanimity of the parties present and voting is required to pass such proposed 
amendments that would take the environmental considerations more into account. Passing 
such amendments is quite difficult in the ECT context, as there are over 50 Contracting 
Parties, and some of them have explicitly stated that they do not consider any changes to the 
ECT necessary for the time being. Furthermore, as stated in ECT Article 42(4): 
“Amendments shall enter into force between Contracting Parties having ratified, 
accepted or approved them on the ninetieth day after deposit with the Depositary of 
instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval by at least three-fourths of the 
Contracting Parties.”360 
Thus, passing an amendment, which is challenging in its own right, is not sufficient for the 
changes to take effect. The amendments also have to be ratified and even then, only affect the 
Parties that have ratified them. As Verburg has written, the fact that it took 12 years for the 
relatively unambitious Trade Amendment to come into force in 2010 after its conclusion in 
 
359 ECT Art 36(1) 
360 ECT Art 42(4) 
82 
 
1998 does not bode well for more ambitious or complicated amendments to the ECT.361 To 
summarise, it is evident that ECT should be changed, but any changes to it cannot be taken as 
granted. Therefore, it is essential to pursue other avenues to reach the stated goal of several 
Contracting Parties, namely, to strengthen the protection of the environment under the ECT 
framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
361 Cees Verburg, ‘Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal Certainty in 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (2019) 20 Journal of World Investment & Trade 425-454, 445 
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6. Conclusions 
Throughout this paper, I have discussed the environmental aspects of the Energy Charter 
Treaty. Several leading authors have suggested that the environmental aspects of the ECT 
could have significance in disputes, yet this assertion has received barely any attention. I set 
out to prove such claim and argued firstly, that the ECT, in its current form, can be 
interpreted in a more environmentally sustainable manner, and secondly, how such 
interpretation might be applied in disputes. Further, I have considered why such interpretation 
should be applied by the various actors under the ECT regime, and whether it is enough, or if 
the ECT should be amended. To answer these questions, I have relied on the actual texts of 
the Energy Charter Treaty and the connected documents; analogous case law; and on the 
works of academics. 
A simple reading of the ECT framework revealed the starting point on which to construct the 
arguments made in this paper. The ECT framework contains a plethora of environmental 
aspects, with explicit references to the protection of the environment and sustainable 
development, among other things, albeit these aspects can mostly be characterised as soft law 
obligations. One is, however, hard-pressed to find references to these aspects in the publicly 
available material on investor-state disputes. The Blusun v. Italy tribunal offered a partial 
explanation to this finding – a state can only rely on Article 19 provisions in a reactive 
manner, rather than proactive. This, however, fails to explain why such arguments have not 
been made publicly. 
Furthermore, the tribunals’ findings on the object and purpose of the ECT are often very 
lacking - practically only recognising the investment protection aspects of the Treaty - or 
altogether non-existing, effectively leaving the numerous environmental provisions found in 
the Treaty void of significance. As the Treaty should be interpreted as a whole, and the object 
and purpose of a treaty has significant importance both in the VCLT’s general rule of 
interpretation, and in the more extensive teleological approach to interpretation. Based solely 
on the actual text of the ECT framework and considering the wording of Article 2 in 
particular, I have developed a balanced take on the object and purpose of the ECT. In my 
formulation, the object and purpose of the ECT has been widened to include both the 
protection of investments, and the environment, thus arguably respecting the maxim ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat, the rule of effectiveness.  
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To answer the second question on how the above findings could be utilised in disputes, I 
formulated litigation techniques suited to respond to the most common investor claims under 
the ECT, namely alleged expropriation or breaches of Article 10. The text of the ECT and 
case law of various tribunals suggest that a state cannot successfully rely on the 
environmental provisions of the Treaty to combat expropriation claims. However, the 
wording of, and practice concerning, Article 13 reveals that expropriation claims can be 
successful only in very narrow circumstances. Article 10 provisions, on the other hand, allow 
for the state to rely on environmental provisions in a number of ways, e.g. by arguing that the 
environmental provisions contained within the ECT mean that an investor cannot have 
legitimate expectations that no regulation would be passed, or that environmental regulation 
would be in breach of the legal stability provision. In fact, the sheer volume of environmental 
provisions, explicit calls for action to protect the environment, and the examples of measures 
to protect the environment found within the ECT framework offer a responding state firm 
ground on which to base their arguments concerning the legality of their measures. 
Furthermore, Article 10 is subject to numerous exceptions, which plausibly could also cover 
environmental actions by the state. Relying on such arguments would require the state to 
embrace the formulation of the object and purpose as presented above. There is a 
recognisable trend of environmental values gaining a foothold within the law, both nationally, 
and internationally. This holds true for the ECT as well, as the tribunal in the recent RWE 
Innogy v. Spain arbitration found that measures to protect the life or health of humans, 
animals or plants should not be found to be in breach of Article 10, unless arbitrary or 
discriminating.  
This thesis has been based on the premise that states would wish to combat climate change, 
by passing stricter environmental regulations, which might adversely affect their foreign 
investors. As the implications of the unsustainability of the current emission levels pile up, 
there is no indication that the premise would be false. That being said, the interpretations and 
litigation techniques formulated in this paper remain untested. However, there is ample 
evidence supporting that such arguments could well be successful - ranging from the recent 
findings of the ECT tribunals, to a broader trend of environmental values gaining foothold in 
the application of the law, and the EU’s public will to amend the ECT to explicitly include as 
written rules many of the aspects that have been found through teleological interpretation in 
this paper. As desirable as such amendments to the ECT would be, they seem nevertheless 
unlikely. Thus, the findings presented above, in particular regarding the recent trends of ECT 
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arbitrations and the novel formulation of the object and purpose of the ECT, can offer insight 
to practitioners on how to achieve the goal of finding a more harmonious balance between 
protecting the environment and the interests of investors. As the climate change progresses 
steadfastly, it is plausible that the arguments presented within this paper, or some variation of 
them, will eventually be utilized before an ECT tribunal, and only then will they be truly 
tested. 
